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INTRODUCTION

The development of these rules now defined as ‘Unfair
Competition,’ is one of the romances of legal history.
~Harry D. Nims, Unfair Competition and Trademarks 1
There may be no term in all of intellectual property law as
slippery as “unfair competition.” It is a common refrain that
trademark law “is but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition.” 2 Certainly this implies legal protection beyond what
is protected by trademark law. But what is it? And where is it? Ask
ten trademark lawyers to identify the protections offered by unfair
competition law and you could get ten different answers, but more
likely, you will get a shrug from half the respondents. 3
Lost in history and buried in the interplay between the United
States Trademark Act of 1946 (the “Lanham Act”) and a particularly
innovative treaty lies a clear answer to the question “What is
actionable unfair competition?” This article explains why we have
lost sight of this answer and become confused about the scope of
unfair competition law today by providing a historical examination
of the drafting and enactment of the act and mysterious treaty, and
their forgotten connection.
Tracing unfair competition law’s erratic development, this
article recovers forgotten history. Unfair competition law
underwent significant common law expansion in the decades before
the Great Depression, reaching a high point in protection in
International News Service v. Associated Press in 1918. 4 The timing
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins in
1938, which purported to overturn all of the federal common law,

1

Harry D. Nims, Unfair Competition and Trademarks 2 (3d ed. 1929).

2

See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926) (“The law of
trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.”); United Drug Co. v.
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,
413 (1916); Walgreen Drug Stores, Inc. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 113 F.2d 956, 961
(1940); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law 166 (2003). The statement that trademark law is a species of
the genus that is unfair competition is also repeated. See Int’l Order of Job’s Daughter
v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1980) (“In general, the common law has
been understood as protecting against the broad business tort of ‘unfair competition’ . . .
[t]rademark infringement is a species of this genetic concept.”); J. Thomas McCarthy,
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 2:7 (5th ed. 2019) (citing S. Rep.
No. 1333, at 4 (1946)).

3

See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 1:8 (“Can the tort of unfair competition be defined?
The honest answer is no—not in the abstract. It is no easier and no more productive of
practical results to define generally the exact limits of unfair competition than it is to
define the exact limits of what is a ‘tort’ or a ‘civil wrong.’”).

4

248 U.S. 215 (1918); Harry D. Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks viii (2d ed.
1917) (“[Unfair competition law] is still in its infancy.”).
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was therefore momentous. 5 At that point, most of unfair competition
law had been developed by the federal courts. At this same time,
bills that would ultimately become the Lanham Act 6 were being
debated in Congress. Given this timeline, it is then perplexing that
those bills were not amended to include federal unfair competition
claims. As this article will reveal, what was ultimately enacted were
enigmatic provisions meant to indirectly create federal unfair
competition protection.
The Lanham Act’s legislative history reveals a disinclination to
create a federal unfair competition cause of action. 7 This legislative
history offers the first clue, as of yet unexamined, as to how certain
statutory provisions could nonetheless afford traders expanded
unfair competition protection. This article will expose the potential
of those provisions—still in place today—and explain how they have
come to be overlooked.
One individual’s contributions shed new light on unfair
competition in the act. Edward S. Rogers, generally credited with
drafting the Lanham Act, played an outsized role in the
development of unfair competition law. He revised his draft act from
1920 until 1946. During that period, he was one of a few people
responsible for the text of the chapter on unfair competition in the
1929 General Inter-American Convention for Trademarks and
Commercial Protection (“Inter-American Convention”), 8 a treaty
still in force. These provisions are the most comprehensive
treatment on the subject to date. 9 Rogers also argued and won a
Supreme Court case declaring the treaty to be self-executing. 10
Congress passed the Lanham Act just six years after this ruling
with language pointing to that treaty. 11 With this timeline in mind,
one can read the provisions on unfair competition in the Lanham
Act with newfound perspicuity.
It would be an understatement to say that the Inter-American
Convention is neglected in the literature on U.S. unfair competition
5

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

6

Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1129).

7

See infra Part VI(A).

8

General Inter-American Convention for Trade-mark and Commercial Protection, Feb.
20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, 124 L.N.T.S. 357 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]. The
convention is referred to as both the “Inter-American Convention” and the “Pan
American Convention” in this country, and the “Washington Convention” in Latin
America. The convention entered into force in the United States on February 17, 1931.

9

See Walter J. Halliday, Inter-American Conventions for Protection of Trade-marks, 32 J.
Pat. Off. Soc’y 661, 665-66 (1950) (mentioning Rogers and how the Convention was said
to surpass the achievements of the Paris Convention by not only binding each country
with respect to trademarks, but also to the repression of unfair competition).

10

Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940).

11

The United States Trademark (Lanham) Act of July 5, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat.
427 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127).
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law. It is this convention, however, that contains the unfair
competition law that was meant to be applicable today, but which
has since been lost. The background of this convention tells a story
of how Rogers was able to shape international treaties and federal
statutes in a manner that could have yielded a dramatic expansion
of unfair competition protection. Instead, Rogers’s approach proved
to be too radical a change in actionable claims, and too subtle a
vehicle for such change; Rogers’s vision of unfair competition never
came to pass. As a result, Section 43(a) slowly began to fill the void
that was left. That development, which has been haphazard,
persists today. Cases like Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care
AG, 12 in which foreign trademark owners have successfully pressed
claims of unfair competition in the United States, is part of this
ongoing saga.
Part I identifies the confusion about the scope of unfair
competition law that exists today. Part II traces unfair competition
law from the beginnings of U.S. trademark law in the late 1800s to
the 1946 Lanham Act. This section demonstrates that unfair
competition law cropped up as a means to fill gaps in protection left
by trademark law’s constrained reach, not as a body of law
subsuming trademark law. Part III tracks Edward Rogers’s
contributions to the international and domestic development of
unfair competition law. Part IV describes the pioneering protection
of unfair competition provided by the Inter-American Convention.
Part V discusses how the emergence of the Erie Doctrine in the late
1930s threatened to create a void because state laws on trademark
and unfair competition were underdeveloped compared with federal
law. Part VI interrogates the history of Section 44 of the Lanham
Act, demonstrating that it was meant to incorporate by reference
the unfair competition provisions from Inter-American Convention.
This section describes how the robust unfair competition protection
enabled through Section 44 continues to lie dormant, and Part VII
recounts how Section 43(a) instead emerged as the vehicle for unfair
competition. As a result, Section 43(a) has been dramatically
expanded while unfair competition law, as a distinct area, remains
underdeveloped and continues to be undefined. Finally, Part VIII
will offer some suggestion about how, in light of this history, the
unfair competition law that was lost might be reclaimed.

12

819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016) (allowing a § 43(a) claim by the owner of a Mexican
trademark that had neither used, registered, nor advertised the mark in the United
States against the U.S. registrant of the same mark for the same goods where the
Mexican mark had a reputation in the United States).
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I. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW’S
ENDURING UNCERTAINTY

Unfair competition law has always been baffling. It is
perverse then that it is ever-present; in almost all trademark
litigation, complaints include supplementary claims of unfair
competition. 13
Some think unfair competition protection is narrowly centered
on certain misrepresentations made actionable by Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. 14 Under this view, unfair competition is composed
of infringement of unregistered marks 15 and certain claims of false
advertising 16 and is not very broad at all.
Even this narrow view of unfair competition remains uncertain
as to scope, as a recent case exposed. In Belmora, the central issue
was the extent of Section 43(a)’s unfair competition protection in the
absence of a protectable mark. 17 One may wonder how such a
staggeringly basic question could still be unclear fifty years after
passage of the Lanham Act. The way the case was litigated, 18

13

Complaints often include supplementary unfair competition claims, some under federal
law, and some under state law. These claims, however, are rarely resolved, as they
usually serve as a backup to trademark infringement claims.

14

The Lanham Act, as amended, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018).

15

See McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 4:6. Confining unfair competition to passing off, Judge
Learned Hand stated: “The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly to this . . . that
one merchant shall not divert customers from another by representing what he sells as
emanating from the second. This has been, and perhaps even more now is, the whole
Law and Prophets on the subject, though it assumes many guises.” Yale Electric Corp.
v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928). Justice O’Connor offered a similarly narrow
conception on unfair competition: “its general concern is with protecting consumers from
confusion as to source.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
157 (1989).

16

Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).

17

819 F.3d 697.

18

Likely because there was no certain path to success, the plaintiff waited almost three
years to take legal action even as the defendant used the mark and filed for registration.
The plaintiff never opposed the defendant’s application to register the mark, and when
the plaintiff finally did take action, it attempted to cancel the registration rather than
enjoin the use of the mark. See Prosecution History, USPTO, https://tsdr.uspto.gov/
(search for 78310029 in search bar) [https://perma.cc/WF2K-88XP] (last visited July 17,
2020). Even then, the plaintiff struggled to find a ground on which to base its claim. See
Petition for Cancellation, Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC, Cancellation No.
92047741 (filed T.T.A.B. June 29, 2007). Reading its pleadings—twice amended
following dismissals—one is left with the impression of a claimant flailing in desperation
to land on a cognizable claim. The plaintiff asserted claims under three international
treaties—unusual in itself in such proceedings, two of which were not even ratified by
Mexico. See Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1632 (T.T.A.B.
2014); Amended Petition for Cancellation, Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC,
Cancellation No. 92047741 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 17, 2007); Second Amended Petition for
Cancellation, Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC, Cancellation No. 92047741
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2008).
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arguments made in the case, 19 and the commentary about the
case, 20 all illustrate the continuing lack of clarity about the
boundaries of Section 43(a)’s unfair competition protection.
A contrasting position is that unfair competition goes well
beyond source confusion and false advertising and provides an
umbrella under which a broad number of disparate deceptive trade
practices reside. The most expansive understanding of unfair
competition defines unfair competition simply as any unfairness or
inequitable conduct in trade. 21
19

During oral argument when the appellee emphasized that the plaintiff had no
protectable mark, the court asked, “What’s that got to do with a passing off case?” Oral
Argument, Belmora, LLC. v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016) (No.
15-1335), http://coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/15-1335-20151027.mp3. Only
because the plaintiff had no protectable mark, the court explicitly asked the petitioner,
“are we able to give you relief under 43(a)?” Id.

20

See, e.g., Brief for International Trademark Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at *5, Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumers Care AG, 137 S. Ct. 1202 (No. 16548) (2017) (“The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Belmora . . . adds another variation to the
already confusing array of holdings.”); Barton Beebe, What Trademark Law is Learning
from Right of Publicity, 42 Colum. J.L. & Arts 389, 394 (2019) (“The [opinion in Belmora]
further suggests that the language of section 43(a) refers to any entity in the world,
regardless of whether it is actually using a trademark within the territorial borders of
the United States. In sum, what is conventionally recognized as one of the fundamental
distinctions between trademark law and right of publicity law—that the former requires
a showing of consumer confusion while the latter does not—has arguably become a
distinction without a difference.”); Christine Haight Farley, No Trademark, No Problem,
23 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 304 (2017); Mark P. McKenna & Shelby Niemann, 2016
Trademark Year in Review, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 112, 122 (2016) (“But what is
especially notable about Belmora is its failure to recognize the implications of its decision
for the territoriality of trademark rights. Few concepts are more fundamental in
trademark law than the notion that rights are territorial in nature.”); Marty Schwimmer
and John Welch, U.S. Law Inches Towards Protecting Trademark Reputation Without
Use, World Trademark Review, Autumn 2019, at 78.

21

See, e.g., Telecom Int’l Am. Ltd. v. AT&T, 289 F.3d 185, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (the “law of
unfair competition is a ‘broad and flexible doctrine that . . . has been broadly described
as encompassing any form of commercial immorality, or simply endeavoring to reap
where one has not sown.’”) (quoting Roy Export Co. Establishment v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d
1095, 1105 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also Harry D. Nims, The Law of Unfair Business
Competition (1909) (“it is an equitable rule that no unfair methods in business
competition shall be allowed.”); McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 1:9. The Restatement of
Unfair Competition includes “appropriation of intangible trade values including trade
secrets and the right of publicity,’ as well as “other acts or practices of the actor
determined to be actionable as an unfair method of competition.” Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1995). Throughout the four editions of Harry
Nims’s treatise on the subject spanning 1909 to 1947, Nims included materials on trade
secrets, interference with contracts, and commercial disparagement. Nims (4th ed.
1947). The first edition was titled “The Law of Unfair Business Competition,” but by the
final edition, Nims had changed the title to “The Law of Unfair Competition and
Trademarks.” Nims (1st ed. 1909); Nims (4th ed. 1947). Other claims sometimes
organized under the umbrella of unfair competition include bait and switch selling,
sending baseless cease and desist letters, filing baseless litigation, business defamation,
inducing breach of contract, and predatory pricing. See also McCarthy, supra note 2, at
§ 1:10; Zecharia Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1940); Daniel
M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought,
69 TMR 305, 306 (1979).
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This article will address the distance between these
understandings of unfair competition law and reveal why this
uncertainty persists. In recounting certain episodes in the history of
unfair competition law—some that have been forgotten and some
never before revealed—this article affords greater clarity on unfair
competition law and a new perspective on the relationship between
unfair competition law and trademark law.
This article challenges conventional beliefs about the
relationship between trademark law and unfair competition law.
Recovering these episodes and piecing together timelines, this legal
history reveals that unfair competition law did not beget trademark
law, 22 but the reverse. 23 Unfair competition was developed as a gap
filler for trademark law. The dominant notion today that
trademarks are only a part of the larger area of law of unfair
competition incorrectly suggests otherwise.
This mistake conceals the muddled relationship between
trademark and unfair competition law, 24 as well as the cloudy
provenance of the latter. The idea of unfair competition being the
genus or larger category within which we find the specific law of
trademarks suggests that there is a defined category of protections
that is more expansive than trademark law. But this category has
never been defined in U.S. law; its boundaries have never been
properly demarcated and its location has never been fixed. At no
point was unfair competition so systematically formed as to spin off
another set of common law rights, and in any event the origin of
unfair competition law in the United States is more recent than
trademark law. 25 Although U.S. trademark law dates back to the
mid-19th century, 26 unfair competition law developed slightly later
out of the gaps in protection in trademark law.

22

See, e.g., John M. Fietkiewicz, Section 14 of the Lanham Act—FTC Authority to
Challenge Generic Trademarks, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 440 (1981) (incorrectly stating
that “[t]rademark protection evolved from the common law of unfair competition.”).

23

See Frank I. Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks
4 (1925) (“when we remember that out of the so-called law of technical trademarks has
grown the law of unfair competition”).

24

The genus-species metaphor is problematic here. It implies that trademark law is in a
taxonomic rank subsumed by and shares an essential feature with unfair competition
law much like donkeys are subsumed by the equus genus, being odd-toed ungulates with
slender legs, long heads, relatively long necks, manes, and long tails. See generally Univ.
of Mich. Museum of Zoology, Animal Diversity Web, https://animaldiversity.org/
accounts/Equus/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). The metaphor therefore should beg the
question: What is the family of unfair competition? Unfair competition was categorized
as torts in the Restatement of Torts in 1938 whereas early trademark law was thought
to be within property law.

25

See Nims, supra note 1, at 1-12 (summarizing the legal doctrine of unfair competition).

26

It was not until the end of the industrial revolution that trademark law began to flourish.
See Schechter, supra note 23, at 143-45.
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II. THE ORIGINAL UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW

The first common law protection for trademarks was extremely
limited. These protections developed into formalized rules
protecting “technical trademarks”—those that could eventually be
registered. 27 What later became known as “unfair competition” was
the protection of a limited set of unregistrable 28 symbols referred to
as “trade names.” 29 Trade names consisted of descriptive words,
geographical names, and surnames consistently used by traders. 30
This protection of trade names was initially the full extent of unfair
competition protection. 31
The fact of registration was then a means of demarcating the
subject matter of trademark and unfair competition law. Although
the cases are less clear than this tidy division, technical trademark
cases involved a property right protected by trademark law,
whereas in unfair competition cases the complainant had no
property interest in what was imitated. 32 As a result, unfair
competition protection was limited and contained effective
constraints such as direct competition, intent to deceive, and
diverted sales. Because the claim was based on no certain ground,
such as property, courts were reluctant to cede these preconditions.

27

The 1881 Trademark Act—the nation’s first federal trademark act—addressed only
registration and the rights that flow from it. The 1870 Trademark Act was found
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).

28

Only trade names that had been exclusively used for a period of ten years before the
enactment of the statute were registrable under the 1905 Act. Trademark Act of 1905,
ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 727.

29

See, e.g., H. Becker & Co. v. C.A. Gambrill Mfg. Co., 38 App. D.C. 535, 537 (1912) (holding
that “Orange Grove” is geographical and “not subject to registration as a technical
trademark”); In re Wright, 33 App. D.C. 510, 512 (1909); see also Milton Handler, Unfair
Competition, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 182 (1936) (“The legal remedy for the protection of
trademarks is known as trademark infringement. ‘Unfair competition’ is the remedy for
trade names.”).

30

“Trade names” were essentially the equivalent of today’s marks that require secondary
meaning for protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018); William Henry Browne, Treatise on
the Law of Trade-Marks and Analogous Subjects § 91 (2d ed. 1885) [hereinafter TradeMarks and Analogous Subjects (2d. ed. 1885)].

31

McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 1:15 (“‘Unfair Competition’ was the name of th[e] part of
the law which gave protection to ‘trade names’—designations that did not qualify as
‘technical trademarks’ but had acquired a secondary meaning as a mark.”).

32

See Nims, supra note 1, at 24; Edward S. Rogers, Unfair Competition, 35 TMR 126, 12627 (1945) (“The notion that there is ‘property’ in trade-marks as a separate thing was
once quite generally entertained and for a while it served well enough, but it was very
soon perceived that a trader’s customers might be diverted by the imitations of things
which were not trade-marks and in which property rights could not be maintained.”).
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A. The Former Constraints on Trademark Law
Early trademark law engendered fears of monopolies much more
than it does today. 33 The monopoly rights created in patents and
copyright were tolerable because they were necessary to achieve a
greater public good. Trademarks, which were neglected by the
Constitution, were seen to be unworthy of the cost. 34
There were several features of early trademark law that served
to constrain the rights of trademark owners so that they would not
resemble monopoly rights. The subject matter of trademarks was
narrowly construed; only a limited range within the broad range of
indicia of source could qualify as a trademark. Most of what is today
referred to as “trade dress” was excluded. An 1898 treatise author
recorded examples of indicia of source ruled not subject to
appropriation as a trademark:
There is no valid trade-mark in a piece of tin as a tag for
tobacco, regardless of its color, shape, or inscription. . . .
There is no right to the use of material substances on which
a word, figures, or emblems, may be impressed or
engraved. . . . Nor can there be a trade-mark in a peculiar
method of arranging soap. . . . Nor for chewing-gum for form
of sticks, or the shape or decoration of boxes. 35
That litany of aspects of certain goods’ presentation was taken from
cases in which each had been purposefully copied to appropriate
another’s goodwill and deceive consumers. In none of those cases,
however, did the law permit a remedy.
Other doctrines served to further limit the scope of a trademark
owner’s rights. The most significant among them was the limitation
of actions to those in which the defendant’s goods were the same as

33

Commentators, judges, and lawyers made frequent references to monopolies while
discussing trademark policy. See generally Beverly W. Pattishall, Trademarks and the
Monopoly Phobia, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 967 (1952).

34

Loughran v. Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co., 286 F. 694, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1923)
(“Patents, copyrights, and trade-marks excite two deeply seated feelings. One is the
feeling of any one who has originated anything of his right to claim an exclusive property
in it and to the trade growing out of it. The other is a hatred of monopoly. The latter
feeling gives way to the former so far as to grant limited monopolies through patents and
copyrights. . . . Mere dealers in commodities are prone to think themselves entitled to a
like monopoly unlimited in time. This is a mistake.”); Chadwick v. Covell, 23 N.E. 1068,
1069 (Mass. 1889) (Holmes, J.) (“The exclusive right to particular combinations of words
or figures for purposes not less useful than advertising—for poetry, or the
communication of truths discovered for the first time by the writer—for art or
mechanical design has needed statutes to call it into being, and is narrowly limited in
time.”).

35

William Henry Browne, A Treatise on the Law of Trade-Marks and Analogous Subjects,
Supp. at 15 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter Trade-Marks and Analogous Subjects (2d ed.
1898)] (emphasis omitted).
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the plaintiff’s. 36 Under the statute, a cause of action for trademark
infringement existed only where a colorable imitation of a registered
mark was used in connection with the sale of “merchandise of
substantially the same descriptive properties” as those set forth in
the registration. 37 Not until the 1946 Lanham Act was this stringent
standard discarded in favor of the looser likelihood of consumer
confusion standard. 38 Under the prior standard, one did not have
the right to exclude others from adopting the same mark for even
slightly dissimilar goods. 39
Other common law doctrinal constraints limited trademark
actions considerably. For instance, trademark owners were
powerless to enjoin the use of their mark on the same goods when
the defendants’ commerce was intrastate rather than interstate. 40
Another significant limitation was the requirement that the use of
the mark by the defendant must be calculated to mislead the public
with respect to the source of origin of the defendant’s goods. 41
Finally, trademark owners had no rights in any territory where they
were not using the mark. In the landmark case of Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 42 in which the defendant used the same mark
on the same goods just 250 miles south of where the plaintiff
conducted his business, the Supreme Court ruled that rights attach
only to the goodwill possessed by the trader and plaintiff’s goodwill
did not extend to the defendant’s area. 43
36

See McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 1:15 (stating that early trademark law protection was
granted “solely to shield the mark owner from having its customers confused and
diverted away by a confusingly similar mark used by a direct rival.”). A trademark could
only be infringed by a direct competitor. Id.

37

See Trademark Act of 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533; Trademark Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch.
592, 33 Stat. 724; Trademark Act of 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502; Philco Corp. v. F. & B.
Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 958, 959 (7th Cir. 1948).

38

The Lanham Act dispensed with the requirement that the parties’ goods be of similar
character. McCarthy, supra note 2, at §§ 3:10-3:12.

39

See, e.g., Am. Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926); Certain-Teed
Prods. Corp. v. Phila. & Suburban Mortg. Guar. Co., 49 F.2d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 1931);
Nieman v. Plough Chem. Co., 22 F.2d 73, 79 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 603
(1928); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir. 1925), aff’d,
273 U.S. 629 (1927); Peninsular Chem. Co. v. Levinson, 247 F. 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1917).

40

See, e.g., U.S. Printing & Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U.S. 156, 158
(1929); Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1942). Interstate commerce,
necessary for federal regulation, could be satisfied only by the crossing of state line with
the physical transport of goods from state to state. Otherwise, commerce was judged to
occur only within the state.

41

As the Supreme Court made clear in Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, “in all cases
where rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are invaded, it is invariably held that
the essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor
as those of another; and that it is only when this false representation is directly or
indirectly made that the party who appeals to a court of equity can have relief.” 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 311, 322 (1871).

42

240 U.S. 403 (1916).

43

Id. at 420.
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The sweet spot for trademark infringement involved a defendant
using a colorable imitation of the plaintiff’s registered mark in
connection with the sale of identical goods. Pre-Lanham Act, falling
outside of this zone could doom a plaintiff’s case because there was
no stable legal right apart from the severely curtailed rights found
in trademark law. For example, in an 1885 case in which the
defendant used deception to “obtain unfair advantage,” the judge
nonetheless denied relief, albeit with “with extreme reluctance,”
because of the absence of a legal right to enjoin unfair competition
at that time. 44 Some courts, however, gave in to the frustration
engendered by the gaps in protection. In a case at around the same
time in which the defendant deceived consumers by simulating the
appearance of the plaintiff’s goods, but had not copied the plaintiff’s
trademark, 45 the court ruled for the plaintiff. It believed such
deviousness could not be countenanced by the law. It was unfair
competition, though no legal doctrine by this name then existed.
B. The Growth of Unfair Competition Law
Both trademark law and unfair competition law developed
rapidly at the turn of the century. Frank Schechter reports that “in
1870 only one hundred and twenty-one trade-marks were registered
. . . while in 1923 almost fifteen thousand were registered.” 46 As
Robert Bone has explained, this turn of the century growth resulted
from three contributing events: the creation of nationwide markets
spawning the need for consumers to familiarize themselves with
brands rather than manufacturers; the diversification of product
lines enabling manufacturers to extend their existing goodwill to
new products; and the emergence of psychological advertising
causing firms to invest their marks with emotional messages. 47
44

Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Hamblen, 23 F. 225, 225-26 (N.D. Ill. 1885) (“The object of the
defendants in causing an Illinois corporation to be created, bearing the same name as
the complainant company, is obvious. They hope, by this means, to secure the benefit of
part, at least, of the patronage which the complainant has acquired. Unwilling to engage
in open, manly competition with the complainant and others carrying on the same
business, the defendants resort to a trick or scheme whereby they hope to deceive the
public and obtain an unfair advantage of the complainant. Such conduct might be fairly
characterized more harshly; and it is with extreme reluctance that I deny the
complainant the relief prayed for.”).

45

Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co, 81 Ky. 73, 86-87 (1883) (“When a workman or
manufacturer . . . adopts and uses [a mark to indicate origin], and his reputation is
thereby built up, it is to him the most valuable of property rights. Sound policy, which
dictates the protection of the public from imposition, the security of the fruits of labor to
the laborer, the encouragement of skillful industry, and, above everything, the
inculcation of truth and honor in the conduct of trade and commerce . . . demands that
such a reputation so gained should be free from the grasp of piracy.”).

46

Schechter, supra note 23, at 134.

47

See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 547, 576-82 (2006).
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Even though the first reported federal trademark case was not
decided until 1844, 48 and there was no effective trademark act until
1881, 49 by 1885 William Henry Browne, the first U.S. treatise
author on the subject—who was already publishing a second edition,
observed that “no other branch of legal science has had a more rapid
growth during the [past] twelve years” than trademark law. 50
Unfair competition law, in contrast, was only then making its
first appearance. In 1898—after a half century of reported U.S.
trademark cases—Browne published a revised second edition of his
treatise in which he announced that unfair competition had
“generally been adopted by the courts.” 51 Still, only one chapter of
the treatise is devoted to the topic. It was titled “Rights Analogous
to Those of Trade-Marks.” 52 Presumably, the chapter was not titled
“Unfair Competition Law” because that phrase would have been
unintelligible in 1898. In that chapter Browne included
“multifarious cases that are not strictly trade-mark matters, and
are beyond recognized technical rules, but which are deemed worthy
of protection.” 53 Permitting a cause of action in cases absent an
actual trademark, unfair competition thus developed as a shadow
around trademark law. 54
A 1906 treatise on tort law suggests that while trademark rights
were “conceived as an invasion of property,” an action in unfair
competition could not “be placed on the plane of invasion of property
right,” but is instead a “tort [that] is strictly one of fraud.” 55 Yet the
expansion of trademark rights over time has been enabled, in part,
48

Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784). The first trademark
case decided by a state court was decided in 1837. Thompson v. Winchester, 19 Pick. 214
(Sup. Ct. Mass. 1837). See also Schechter, supra note 23, at 134 (“Up to 1870 only sixtytwo trade-mark cases in all were decided by American courts.”).

49

The first act of 1870 was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1879. The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (finding the Trademark Act of 1870
unconstitutional because Congress had no constitutional authority to regulate
trademarks under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8).

50

See Trade-Marks and Analogous Subjects (2d ed. 1885), supra note 30. Browne’s first
treatise was published in 1878. See William Henry Browne, Treatise on the Law of
Trade-Marks and Analogous Subjects (1873). He published a new version of the second
edition “revised and enlarged with supplement” in 1898. See Trade-Marks and
Analogous Subjects (2d. ed. 1898), supra note 35. The first English trademark treatise
was not published until 1873, just five years preceding the first American edition.

51

See Trade-Marks and Analogous Subjects (2d ed. 1898), supra note 35, at § 719.

52

See id. Rogers notes that “Law writers did not know where to classify these cases. Digest
compilers put them under an added paragraph heading ‘Cases analogous to trade-mark
cases.’” Rogers, supra note 35, at 127.

53

See Trade-Marks and Analogous Subjects (2d ed. 1898), supra note 35, at § 719.

54

Rogers, supra note 32, at 126-27 (“it was very soon perceived that a trader’s customers
might be diverted by the imitations of things which were not trade-marks and in which
property rights could not be maintained.”).

55

1 Thomas Atkins Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability: Theory and Principles of
Tort 421 (1906).
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by the absence of clarity about its basis; it was never anchored to
one set principle. 56 In his 1925 book on trademark law’s historical
foundations, Schechter reports that some courts resisted the
proposition that trademark rights are based in property. 57 This
resistance to property foundation of trademarks 58 added to the
appeal of unfair competition claims based in tort. Whether or not a
property right exists, the court had jurisdiction over the fraud. 59
Where legal doctrine was absent, the tort of unfair competition
allowed courts to be guided by morality. 60 As one court simply
56

From the start, the rationale of trademark law has been a mix of consumer protection,
commercial morality, and property rights. In one of the earliest reported trademark
cases, the court weaves the three together as justification for interfering in a competitive
relationship:
When we consider the nature of the wrong that is committed when the right of
an owner of a trade-mark is invaded, the necessity for the interposition of a court
of equity becomes still more apparent. He who affixes to his own goods an
imitation of an original trade-mark, by which those of another are distinguished
and owned, seeks, by deceiving the public, to divert and appropriate to his own
use, the profits to which the superior skill and enterprise of the other had given
him a prior an exclusive title. He endeavors, by a false representation, to effect a
dishonest purpose; he commits a fraud upon the public, and upon the true owner
of the trade-mark.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. Ch. 599, 605-06 (N.Y. Ch. 1849). See also Mark
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839,
1841 (2007) (arguing that trademark law was not originally intended to protect the
consumer, but instead sought to protect producers from “illegitimate diversions of their
trade by competitors”).

57

Schechter, supra note 23, at 150 (“[t]he main difficulties of the courts and also of textwriters has been . . . the nature of trade-mark rights and the proper bases for the
protection of these rights. The principal obstruction to the development of the law in
accordance with the necessities of business has been the uncertainty of those
administering or commenting upon the laws to whether or not trade-marks are what
they term ‘property.’”).

58

See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcomm. of Trade-Marks of the H. Comm.
on Patents, 75th Cong. 53 (1938) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 9041] (statement by
Rogers) (“[f]or 50 years there has been a discussion in the cases whether a trade-mark is
property, or not, and whether its infringement is a violation of a property right, or merely
an actionable wrong or tort.”).

59

As one court that eschewed the trademark/property theory noted,
[w]e are of opinion that it is not necessary to decide whether the plaintiff's label
with the accompanying words and devices constituted a trademark, and as such
the exclusive property of the plaintiff, for the reason that it is a fraud on a person
who has established a business for his goods, and carries it on under a given name
or with a particular mark, for some other person to assume the same name or
mark, or the same with a slight alteration, in such a way as to induce persons to
deal with him in the belief that they are dealing with a person who has given a
reputation to that name or mark.
Pierce v. Guittard, 8 P. 645, 646-47 (Cal. 1885).

60

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International News was explicit about its
reliance on morality: “If the facts are as we have now found them, no party asserts that
the acts restrained by the injunction as issued can be justified, either in law or morals”;
and “[i]t is immoral, and that is usually unfair to some one.” 245 F. 244, 247, 252 (2d Cir.
1917).
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stated: “‘Unfair Competition’ consists in selling goods by means
which shock judicial sensibilities; and the Second Circuit has long
been very sensitive.” 61 Unfair competition law offered courts a
vehicle for their desire to offer a remedy not in relation to a violation
of a right, but in response to “odious” conduct. Where courts saw a
wrong, they found a remedy in unfair competition. 62
The legal basis of unfair competition in tort law resulted in a
doctrine that was adaptable to new forms of deception for which
there was no legal precedent. It was argued that this adaptability
was necessary for the law to effectively keep up with the innovative
“schemers.” 63
It was in this context that the theory of “goodwill” took hold. As
the Supreme Court explained in Hanover Star Milling Co., the law
treats trademarks “as merely a protection for the good will, and not
the subject of property except in connection with an existing
business.” 64 That is, the property interest is not the trademark, but
the underlying goodwill that the trademark represents. 65 This
theory enabled a blurring of the line between trademark
infringement and unfair competition protection, as both were based
on the same principle: “[e]ach is a trespass upon business good
will.” 66 The implications of this theory were profound. 67 If the
property interest is the goodwill, the chains of trademark fall away
because the goodwill of a trader can be embodied in “the numberless
61

Margarete Steiff, Inc. v. Bing, 215 Fed. 204, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).

62

One court desirous to find a remedy concluded that
[u]pon this bald statement of facts it cannot be gainsaid that defendant has done
the plaintiff wrong, and it is said that for every wrong there is a remedy. . . . ‘Tis
strange if plaintiff may be deprived of the fruits of a long course of honest and
fair dealing in business by such wicked contrivances, and upon appeal to the
courts for relief should be told there was no relief.
Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142, 145 (Cal. 1895).

63

As one court reasoned,
the fact that the question comes to us in an entirely new guise, and that the
schemer had concocted a kind of deception heretofore unheard of in legal
jurisprudence, is no reason why equity is either unable or unwilling to deal with
him. . . . [Defendant] is stealing its goodwill, a most valuable property, only
secured after years of honest dealing and large expenditures of money; and equity
would be impotent, indeed, if it could contrive no remedy for such a wrong.
Id. at 145 (emphasis added).

64

Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916).

65

Nims, supra note 1, at 35 (explaining that “[i]t is the good-will . . . and not trademarks
or names that the court seeks to protect in unfair competition cases”).

66

Edward S. Rogers, Comments on the Modern Law of Unfair Trade, 3 Ill. L. Rev. 551, 55558 (1909) (“Recently . . . judges have begun to appreciate . . . that this business good will
is the property to be protected against invasion.”). According to Professor Bone, “[t]he
goodwill-as-property theory” took firm hold in early 20th century and was “used to unify,
at the level of general principle, the distinct but closely related torts of trademark
infringement and unfair competition.” Bone, supra note 47, at 572.

67

See Bone, supra note 47, at 574.
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ways in which a purchaser is enabled to recognize the particular
article he wants.” 68 Suddenly, all of these are protected by unfair
competition law. Another court indicated the law’s breadth: “Where
the goods of a manufacturer have become popular not only because
of their intrinsic worth, but also by reason of the ingenious,
attractive and persistent manner in which they have been
advertised, the good will thus created is entitled to protection.” 69
Unfair competition law was thus extended beyond the tight
boundary of trade names. 70 Whereas the categories of protection
were formerly constrained in a way unrecognizable to a trademark
lawyer today, unfair competition began to embrace the protection of
a trader’s use of “any artifice or contrivance for the purpose of
representing his goods.” 71 Writing in 1936, Professor Milton
Handler explained that “[t]he concept of unfair competition has not
been confined to the infringement of tradenames. It has been
extended to the imitation of labels, packages, color, dress, form and
appearance of articles.” 72 When one recalls that the law had
previously not allowed for the protection of the shape or decoration
of boxes, 73 this uncomplicated extension of unfair competition
protection to trade dress is remarkable.
The option of an expanded unfair competition claim provided
traders with a strategic maneuver around the strict requirements
of trademark law. Thus in Gruelle v. Molly-’Es Doll Outfitters, Inc.,
where the trademark for RAGGEDY ANN was abandoned for nonuse, the plaintiff was able to successfully advance an unfair
competition claim against a competitor who produced and sold
“deceptively similar” dolls marked as “Raggedy Ann” and “Raggedy
Andy.” 74 It is no wonder that in 1917 one treatise author exclaimed
that unfair competition law’s “possibilities of growth and
effectiveness are almost unlimited.” 75
68

Rogers, supra note 66, at 555-58 (“good will could be . . . represented in many other ways
than by technical trade marks; by names not trade marks, by labels, by the get-up or
dress, by the form of the goods themselves or the style of the enclosing package.”).

69

Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 F. 896, 897-98 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1897).

70

With today’s eyes, we might categorize some of these early cases as involving trade dress.
See, e.g., Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142, 145 (Cal. 1895) (finding that the
defendant used not only a similar name, but also copied the plaintiff’s distinctive
architecture).

71

Weinstock, Lubin & Co., 42 P. at 145 (emphasis added) (“We think the principle may be
broadly stated, that when one tradesman resorts to the use of any artifice or contrivance
for the purpose of representing his goods or his business as the goods or business of a
rival tradesman, thereby deceiving the people by causing them to trade with him when
they intended to and would have otherwise traded with his rival, a fraud is committed—
a fraud which a court of equity will not allow to thrive.”).

72

Handler, supra note 29, at 182.

73

See Trade-Marks and Analogous Subjects (2d ed. 1898), supra note 35, at 37.

74

Gruelle v. Molly-’Es Doll Outfitters, Inc., 94 F.2d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1937).

75

Nims, supra note 1, at viii.
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Unfair competition law, however, was not without its own
constraints. A claim of unfair competition required the plaintiff to
show that the defendant committed intentional fraud. 76 Limitations
on unfair competition protections are difficult to discern, however,
because courts were more likely to describe the tort with an
illustration rather than by supplying a definition or legal
standard. 77 Still, fraudulent intent and economic injury are
regularly included in these illustrations. 78 Unfair competition
claims involving descriptive or generic terms were also not likely to
be successful. 79 A trader, for instance, could not enjoin the use of the
same name on the same goods if it was also the defendant’s
surname. 80 In addition, the requirement of a competitive
relationship was necessary 81 although not always explicitly stated,
since most unfair competition cases did involve direct competitors.
Still, unfair competition law’s adaptability to new situations meant
that requirements could be swapped out as needed and the “courts
gradually jettisoned the competition” requirement. 82 One of the
most famous examples of this requirement’s circumvention is the
case of Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 83 in which the owner of
the trademark VOGUE for magazines sued a milliner who was
marketing VOGUE hats. The Sixth Circuit, in reversing the district
court’s dismissal of the unfair competition claim due to lack of
competition, declared that “there is no fetish in the word
76

See Pierce v. Guittard, 8 P. 645, 646-47 (Cal. 1885); Street, supra note 55, at 421 (“a
fraudulent intent or its equivalent is essential to liability”); Handler, supra note 29, at
184 (“A trademark will be protected even against innocent infringement; a tradename,
only against fraudulent simulation.”).

77

Handler, supra note 29, at 175.

78

80 F. at 897-98 (“The action is based upon deception, unfairness and fraud and when
these are established the court should not hesitate to act.”); Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v.
Goldwyn, 296 F. 391, 401 (2d Cir. 1924) (“Fraud is the basis of [the] complaint in such
cases.”).

79

See, e.g., American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg., Co., 103 F. 281, 285 (6th Cir. 1900)
(refusing to enjoin a washboard manufacturer who sold washboards that copied the
plaintiff’s habit of marking them “Aluminum” even though they were in fact made of
zinc.). The court reasoned that because there was no private right of action based on
fraud, a claim of deception of the public must be based on “the property rights of [the]
complainant.” Id.

80

See Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461, 472 (1914) (refusing to enjoin
defendant from using his surname even though plaintiff had registered it).

81

Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813,
824 (1927) (“if there [was] no competition, there [could] be no unfair competition.”); Bone,
supra note 47, at 565-66.

82

Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24
Santa Clara Comput. & High Tech. L.J. 469, 480 n.64 (2008). At the time, some
commentators referred to competition-less unfair competition as “unfair dealing.” See,
e.g., 1 Rudolf Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks § 8 (1945);
Handler, supra note 29, at 179.

83

300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).

Vol. 110 TMR

755

‘competition.’” 84 Instead, it found that “[t]he invocation of equity
rests more vitally upon the unfairness.” 85 The court concluded that
“The injury to A. is present, and the fraud upon the consumer is
present; nothing else is needed.” 86
The Supreme Court’s decision in International News in 1918
represents the high water mark of common law unfair competition
expansion. 87 In deciding that International News Service engaged
in actionable conduct by taking Associated Press’s news stories from
publicly available sources, rewriting them, and selling them as its
own, the majority found itself in need of a source of law. Unfair
competition became the vehicle to sanction undesirable behavior
that did not run afoul of any property or contract right. The Court
found it “unfair” due to the “unauthorized interference” with the
“normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at
the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert . . . the
profit from those who have earned it to those who have not; with
special advantage to defendant . . . because of the fact that it is not
burdened with any part of the expense.” 88 Such an act “speaks for
itself, and a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in
characterizing it as unfair competition.” 89
The law had come a long way from protecting technical
trademarks to protecting goodwill, and from protecting against
trespasses to property to protecting against reaping where one has
not sown. This shift occurred in the common law in a matter of
decades, but it was not yet reflected in statutory law.
III. THE SINGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
OF EDWARD ROGERS
Edward S. Rogers was one of the foremost experts on U.S.
trademark and unfair competition law in the first half of the
twentieth century. 90 He was one of a handful of trademark law

84

Id. at 512.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

248 U.S. 215 (1918).

88

Id. at 240.

89

Id.

90

Miles J. Alexander, Reflection, Former Editors-in-Chief, 101 TMR 7, 9 (2011) (“[Rogers
was] perhaps the greatest trademark scholar and lawyer in the first half of the 20th
century.”); Chafee, supra note 21, at 1289 (“[Rogers was] one of the leading American
writers and practitioners in the field.”); Bone, supra note 47, at n.119 (“[Rogers was] the
most famous and prolific trademark writer in the early twentieth century.”). At the time
of his death, Rogers was so well regarded in U.S. trademark law that the Trademark
Reporter devoted an entire volume to his legacy. In Memoriam, Edward S. Rogers
Memorial Edition, 62 TMR 175-265 (1972).
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specialists in the United States prior to World War I. 91 He cofounded the first firm to specialize in trademark law in the U.S. 92
and argued or briefed almost half of all of the trademark cases that
the Supreme Court heard prior to the passage of the Lanham Act. 93
By the 1920s, Rogers had become known as the “Dean of the
Trademark Bar.” 94
Rogers is also hailed as the “father of the Lanham Act.” 95 As a
result of his knowledge and esteem, in 1920, Rogers was appointed
by the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the American
Bar Association as chairman of a committee to draft a new
trademark bill to supplant the Trade Mark Act of 1905. 96 The bill he
drafted ultimately became the 1946 Lanham Act, 97 although it was
originally known as the “Rogers Bill.” 98
Rogers was a successful practitioner as well as a prolific scholar.
His 1914 book, Good Will, Trade-Marks and Unfair Trading, 99
remained one of the leading texts in trademark law for decades. 100
As the title suggests, the book both advances the theory of goodwill
and the extension of protection against unfair competition, although
that terminology had yet to be adopted. 101 Rogers’s writing indicates
that he was fairly obsessed with the topic of unfair competition law.
On this subject alone he wrote one book 102 and published eleven
other papers. 103 Stephen Ladas, another esteemed trademark
91

Keith M. Stolte, A Response to Jerome Gilson’s Call for an Overhaul of the Lanham Act,
94 TMR 1335, 1346-1348 (2004).

92

William T. Woodson, A Profile of Edward S. Rogers, 62 TMR 177, 177 (1972) (stating
that in 1900 the firm Reed and Rogers specialized in trademark law). Rogers represented
corporate clients such as Thomas Edison, Coca-Cola, Standard Oil, General Mills, Singer
Sewing Machines, Quaker Oats, Corning Glass, and Life Savers. Obituary, E.S. Rogers,
Expert on Patent Law: Board of Chairman of Sterling Drug Co. Dies—Sponsored Many
Fair-Trade Statutes, 74, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1949.

93

Rogers argued or briefed 12 of the 40 pre-Lanham Act trademark cases heard by the
Supreme Court before the Lanham Act was enacted.

94

Pattishall, supra note 33, at 967; Julius R. Lunsford Jr, Foreword, 62 TMR iv (1972).

95

Miles J. Alexander, 100th Anniversary Issue: Reflections of Former Editors-in-Chief, 101
TMR 9, 9-10 (2011); see also Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark
Law, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 731, 755 (2003) (calling Rogers the “father of the Lanham Act”).

96

Woodson, supra note 92, at 186-87.

97

See Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks, 14 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 173, 180 (1949) (recounting how he drafted what was introduced by
Congressman Lanham in 1938 as the original bill based on ABA committee meetings).

98

Woodson, supra note 92, at 187.

99

Edward S. Rogers, Good-Will Trade-Marks and Unfair Trading (1914).

100

See Woodson, supra note 92, at 186 (stating that Rogers’ book “was and still is often
quoted as authority”).

101

See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 66, at 555.

102

Rogers, supra note 97.

103

Edward S. Rogers, Business Good-Will and Trade-Marks Nationally and Internationally
Considered, 34 TMR 281 (1939); Rogers, Comments on the Modern Law of Unfair Trade,
3 Ill. L. Rev. 551 (1909); Edward S. Rogers, Doctrine of Unfair Trade, 7 Mich. L. Rev. 409
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expert, credits Rogers with contributing the concept of “unfair
trade” to trademark law, which was understood as encompassing
“any act, not necessarily fraudulent, which actually interferes with
the normal course of trade to the disadvantage of another.” 104
According to Professor Walter Derenberg, Rogers “was one of the
first to recognize the need for a federal law of unfair competition . . .
[with a] ‘catchall’ provision against ‘all forms of unfair competition,’
a proposal which had been advocated by Mr. Rogers as far back as
1909.” 105
Rogers’s promotion of unfair competition law went beyond
scholarship. In his practice, Rogers successfully advanced claims of
unfair competition that extended the law’s reach. 106 In his cases and
in his writing, Rogers advocated for flexibility in the law because
not all devious acts could be foreseen. He warned that “by the time
the judicial machinery arrives at a place where the pirate was
yesterday, . . . that elusive person has moved [to] a place where the
courts will not reach until tomorrow—and is there engaged in doing
something which will enable him to advantage himself at someone’s
else expense in some manner hitherto unthought of.” 107
Rogers also understood that traders may encounter such
“pirates” in foreign lands as well. Likely because many of his clients
were contemplating a global marketplace, he was concerned about
practices such as the pre-emptive adoption and registration of U.S.
(1909); Edward S. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act,
38 TMR 259 (1948); Edward S. Rogers, New Directions in the Law of Unfair Competition,
74 N.Y. L. Rev. 317 (1940); Edward S. Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade,
27 Harv. L. Rev. 139 (1913); Edward S. Rogers, Unfair Competition, 35 TMR 126 (1945);
Edward S. Rogers, Unfair Competition, 17 Mich. L. Rev. 490 (1919); Edward S. Rogers,
Foreword to Walter J. Derenberg, Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair Trading lxix
(1936); Edward S. Rogers, The Legal Side of Fair Trade, Speech at the Annual Meeting
of Association of National Advertisers Inc. (1937).
104

Stephen P. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights: National and International
Protection 1702 (1975).

105

Walter J. Derenberg, The Contribution of Edward S. Rogers to the Trademark Act of
1946 in Historical Perspective, 62 TMR 189, 194 (1972) (citing Rogers, supra note 66).

106

See, e.g., Larson v. Wrigley, 20 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1927) (advancing an unfair competition
claim based on Wrigley’s SPEARMINT gum trade dress); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v.
Kirkland Distributing Co., 48 App. D.C. 248 (D.C. Cir. 1918) (arguing that his client’s
use of the image of Aunt Jemima on pancake flour should prevent the registration of a
mark for flour consisting of “the bust of a negro holding a piece of watermelon under the
chin, surmounted by the words ‘Good Enuf’”); American Trading Co. v. H.E. Heacock Co.,
285 U.S. 247 (1932) (arguing that a common surname should be protected against unfair
competition when it acquires secondary significance as indicating a particular trader);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. Leterstone Sales Co., 27 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1939)
(arguing that a misleading use of an arguably generic word was unfair competition);
Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1935) (arguing
that a competitor’s use of “Olde Maestro” for beer was unfair competition when his
client’s beer was the sponsor for the radio show of a performer known as the Olde
Maestro).

107

Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act, supra note 103, at
270.
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marks abroad, or the marking of foreign goods so as to suggest an
origin in the United States. 108
IV. THE 1929 INTER-AMERICAN
TRADEMARK CONVENTION
Given Rogers’s expertise and reputation in the field of
trademark law, it was not surprising that he would have been
appointed as one of the three U.S. delegates to the 1929 PanAmerican Trademark Convention, a convention tasked with
drafting a new trademark treaty for the Americas. By 1929, Rogers
had been drafting the new trademark act for nine years. Four year
earlier, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property had undergone a revision, which added provisions on
unfair competition. 109 Rogers would have seen the potential to
extend those protections across the Americas in this new
multilateral agreement. No doubt this project would have appeared
to Rogers as momentous work.
The 1929 convention was an outgrowth of several preceding PanAmerican conferences—a forty-year-long effort to create a PanAmerican Union for trade in the Americas. These conferences grew
out of the Pan-Americanism movement in the United States in the
early twentieth century whose objectives included replacing Europe
as the dominant power in the region, using institutionalism as an
alternative to U.S. territorial expansionism and military
interventions, and cultivating Latin America as a commercial
marketplace for goods manufactured in the United States. 110 The
ambitions of the union even included the creation of a common
customs union, railway system, and currency, among other
things. 111
108

A New Way of Dealing with Foreign Trade-Mark Piracy, 8 Bull. of the U.S. Trade-Mark
Assoc. 338 (1912) (recounting how Rogers sued a defendant in a New York state court
who had preemptively registered BIG BEN in Mexico); Edward S. Rogers, One Way to
Stop the Foreign Good-Will Pirate, 81 Printer’s Ink 36 (1912); Edward S. Rogers, Your
Trade-Mark in Foreign Markets: How to Prevent Piracy and Other Pitfalls in Registering
Your Trade-Mark in Foreign Lands, 26 System: The Magazine of Business 363 (1914).

109

See International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, Nov.
6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789 (modified at The Hague); International Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748.

110

The Cuban nationalist José Martí, who attended the 1889 Congress as a journalist,
reported that the United States invited the other American nations to join a union only
because it was “glutted with unsaleable merchandise and determined to extend its
dominions in America.” José Martí, On the Pan-American Congress, La Nación,
December 19–20, 1889, available at https://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/slatta/hi453/PS/
marti.htm (last visited June 28, 2020).

111

Fifth International Conference of American States, Special Handbook for the Use of the
Delegates 6 (1922) (listing the topics the Conference was called upon to consider: “1. To
preserve the peace and promote the prosperity of the American states. 2. Formation of
an American customs union. 3. Establishment of regular and frequent communication
between the American States. 4. Establishment of a uniform system of customs
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The 1929 convention was the culmination of efforts dating back
to 1889 to harmonize trademark protection in the Americas. There
had been six Pan-American conventions dealing with trademarks
that preceded it, but those conventions proved to be substantively
deficient. 112 The first Pan-American convention was as early as
1889, just years after 1883 Paris Convention, the first multilateral
industrial property treaty. One reason for the interest in concluding
regional agreements on intellectual property in the Americas was
that most Latin American states were not then members of the
Paris Union. 113 The 1929 convention included nineteen signatory
countries, 114 but only ten states ultimately ratified the convention:
Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, and the United States. The convention entered into
force on April 2, 1930, and remains in force today in every one of the
original member states. 115

regulations. 5. Adoption of a uniform system of weights and measures, and laws to
protect patents, copyrights, and trade-marks. 6. Adoption of a common silver coin. 7.
Agreement upon the recommendation for adoption to their Governments of a definite
plan of arbitration. 8. Consideration of other matters relating to the welfare of the
several countries, which may be presented at the Conference.”).
112

The six conventions were ratified in 1889, 1902, 1906, 1910, 1923, and 1929.

113

Only Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico became members of the Paris Union by 1929. Brazil was
a founding member of the Paris Convention in 1883, and Mexico and Cuba ratified in
1903 and 1904, respectively. The United States ratified the Paris Convention in 1887. A
few other Latin American states were original signatories to the Paris Convention, only
to denounce it shortly thereafter. The Dominican Republic acceded in 1884, but
denounced in 1888. Guatemala acceded in 1884, but denounced in 1894. Ecuador acceded
in 1884, but denounced in 1885. Ladas, supra note 104, at 1745 n.1; see WIPOAdministered Treaties Paris Convention, World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”) (last visited Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.
jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2. During the 1929 Pan American Conference, it was stated that
Brazil and Cuba intended to withdraw from the Paris Convention. Pan American
Trademark Conference, Minutes of the Plenary Sessions and of the Committees of the
Conferences, Feb. 11–20, 1929, p. 5 [hereinafter Minutes of the Plenary Sessions]. Cuba
was also a member of the Madrid Agreement of 1891. See WIPO-Treaties and
Contracting Parties Madrid Agreement, WIPO (last visited Feb. 18, 2020)
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1292C. In 1906, Argentina
invited the United States Trademark Association (“USTA”) to comment on its domestic
trademark
law.
International
Trademark
Association
(“INTA”),
About
INTA History, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20180513071236/www.inta.org/
history/pages/history.aspx (last visited June 28, 2020). Similarly, in 1908, Ecuador asked
the USTA to propose a trademark law, which was to become the model for other Latin
American countries. Id.

114

The signatories to the convention were Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. InterAmerican Convention, supra note 8.

115

See WIPO, Contracting Parties/Signatories: General Inter-American Convention for
Trade-Mark and Commercial Protection, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/
other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=353&group_id=21 (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
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A. The Convention’s Innovative Text

Several features of the 1929 convention distinguish it from the
preceding Pan-American conventions. The 1929 convention was the
first to include specific protections against unfair competition. This
fact may not be surprising given the 1925 addition of unfair
competition protections in the Paris Convention. The 1929
convention, however, did more than simply copy the Paris
Convention’s provisions. It devoted an entire chapter to unfair
competition. The importance of unfair competition protection can
also be seen in the preamble of the convention, which states that the
contracting states were “animated by the desire to reconcile the
different juridical systems which prevail in the several American
Republics” and resolved to negotiate the convention “for the
protection of trade marks, trade names, and for the repression of
unfair competition and false indications of geographical origin.” 116
The text of the agreement certainly supports this statement and
appears to have Rogers’s imprint on it.
Rogers was no ordinary delegate to this convention; it would be
impossible to overstate his contributions. There is reason to believe
that he was chiefly responsible for the text. I have conducted
extensive research to determine the origins of the draft text that
ultimately became the final text of the agreement. The origins of
this text are intriguing because of the innovative approach the
convention takes. Many of the provisions in the convention went
beyond both U.S. and international law.
The drafting of the text of the 1929 convention did not follow the
prescribed procedure. Officially, the delegates were to meet to
discuss a draft text prepared by an appointed committee. 117 That
committee consisted of three Latin American diplomats, none of
whom were trademark experts. 118 The draft text that the committee
ultimately produced was preoccupied with creating a registrationbased system for the Americas as an alternative to the Madrid
116

Inter-American Convention, supra note 8.

117

A resolution was made at the previous conference held in Havana a year earlier to
appoint a special committee of the governing board of the Pan American Union to draft
a text for the delegates to consider at the Washington conference. A draft was thus
prepared by a committee composed of the Cuban Ambassador to United States and
ministers from Ecuador and Uruguay and submitted to the conference on November 23,
1928. Pan American Trademark Conference, Preparatory Data for the Pan American
Trade Mark Conference: Report of the Committee of the Governing Board of the Pan
American Union, Feb. 11, 1929. The governments were requested to send to the Pan
American Union any “suggestions and observations that may be utilized in the formation
of the bases of a project that shall be prepared by the Pan American Union and that shall
serve as a basis of discussion when the conference convenes.” Stephen P. Ladas, Pan
American Conventions on Industrial Property, 22 Am. J. Int’l L. 803 (1928) (citing
Documentary Information Compiled by the Pan American Union relative to the Pan
American Trade Mark Conference, Washington, 1928, p. 1.).

118

Id.
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Arrangement. 119 As a result, this draft did not contain a single
provision on unfair competition protection.
Just prior to the conference, Dr. Stephen P. Ladas 120 published
a book titled The International Protection of Trade Marks by the
American Republics. 121 Ladas was explicit about his objective in
publishing the book, stating that it was meant to “facilitate the work
of the conference of trade mark experts and specialists of the
American countries, meeting at Washington, February 11, 1929.” 122
In the book, Ladas sharply criticized the committee’s official draft
as inadequate and, rather presumptuously, considering he was not
a delegate, offered his own draft text as a substitute. Apparently,
the Ladas draft was devised by a group of U.S. trademark experts
who met in New York after the committee’s official draft was
circulated. 123 Other than Ladas, the members of the group remain
anonymous, but it is likely that Rogers was among them.
The Ladas draft was radically different from the committee’s. It
marked the first time unfair competition was mentioned in any text
associated with the Pan-American efforts, and its inclusion in the
convention therefore resulted from the efforts of the U.S. experts,
and not the Latin American delegates. Ladas not only included a
provision modelled on the then four-year-old article 10bis of the
Paris Convention, 124 but he also proposed a model law of unfair
competition in addition to the draft treaty. 125
However, neither the official committee draft nor the unofficial
Ladas draft ended up serving as the basis for the conference
negotiations. Instead, when the delegates assembled in Washington
on February 11, 1929, a delegate from Cuba proposed substituting
the committee’s draft with a completely different draft ostensibly
prepared by the Cuban delegation “[f]or the purpose of expediting
the work of the Conference.” 126 The committee’s official draft was
thus promptly discarded and substituted with the Cuban draft,
119

Stephen P. Ladas, The International Protection of Trade Marks by the American
Republics 53 (1929).

120

Ladas, who emigrated from Greece in the mid-1920s, was a U.S. practitioner and scholar
of international intellectual property law who went on to publish numerous books and
articles and to serve as a U.S. delegate to the Paris Convention. Obituary, Dr. Stephen
P. Ladas, Patent Lawyer, 77, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1976, at 33.

121

Ladas, supra note 119. Ladas had previously published an article titled, Pan American
Conventions on Industrial Property, 22 Am. J. Int’l L. 803 (1928).

122

Ladas, supra note 119, at v.

123

In a footnote in a book published years later, Ladas referred to “preparatory work” done
by U.S. trademark experts—including him—that formed the basis of his draft. Ladas,
supra note 104, at 1754 n.40 (suggesting that the substituted draft predominantly
reflected the results of “preparatory work” undertaken in the U.S. by trademark experts).

124

See International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, Nov.
6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789 (modified at The Hague).

125

See Ladas, supra note 119, at 80-82.

126

Minutes of the Plenary Sessions, supra note 113, at 4.
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which was clearly based on Ladas’s draft, not the initial committee’s
draft, given its striking similarity to the former.
Without entertaining too much conspiratorial conjecture, it
seems implausible that the substitute draft was the work of the two
Cuban delegates, neither of whom were trademark experts. 127
Ladas later acknowledged that this draft was prepared “with the
cooperation of the United States delegation.” 128 This author
suspects that Ladas may have substantially understated the role of
the U.S. delegates. Perhaps by remaining an anonymous drafter,
Rogers was better positioned to advocate for the draft without
seeming to be pushing his own agenda. Thus, the draft appeared to
be contributed by another state’s delegate and was supported by a
published book by an authority unconnected with the proceedings.
After agreeing to accept this new draft text as the basis of
negotiations, the conference then agreed to appoint four committees
to carry out the necessary work. Remarkably, especially as no
previous convention had discussed the topic, one of the four
committees was devoted to “Unfair Competition and False
Indication of Origin.” A second committee was designated as a
“drafting committee” and was limited to only four delegates. 129
Rogers found his way onto the drafting committee. 130
Rogers now had a golden opportunity to codify the law of unfair
competition on a grand scale. He had a well-developed conception of
what the law should prohibit and how to best articulate these new
standards. By this time, he already had years of experience drafting
the U.S. trademark act. 131 Significantly, he also knew that his

127

Moreover, the Cuban delegate who proposed the new draft was Dr. Orestes Ferrara, the
Cuban Ambassador to the United States. As “a strong advocate of close economic ties
between Cuba and the United States,” Ferrara was criticized for his “pro-U.S.
sympathies” as an “annexationist.” See Julius Robert Benjamin, The United States and
Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development 1880–1934, at 45-46 (1974); see also Dr.
Orestes Ferrara, El Panamericanismo y la Opinion Europea (1930) (defending the
Monroe Doctrine and describing U.S. intervention in Caribbean affairs as “paternalistic”
rather than imperialist). Francis White, the chairman of the U.S. delegation, was then
serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and had close
connections in Cuba. See Rosalie Schwartz, Flying Down to Rio: Hollywood, Tourists,
and Yankee Clippers 230 (2004).

128

Ladas, supra note 104, at 1755.

129

Press Release, Pan American Trade Mark Conference, Pan American Trade Mark
Conference, Washington DC—Pan American Trade Mark Conference Opens Sessions 2
(Feb. 11, 1929) (each committee represented one of the four languages spoken by the
delegates).

130

Minutes of the Plenary Sessions, supra note 113, at 3.

131

Rogers began drafting a new trademark act in 1921 in preparation for the ABA
committee meeting, which later proposed and approved Rogers’ draft, known as the
“Vestal Bill.” McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 5:4. In 1937, Representative Lanham, who
was then Chairman of the House Patent Committee, invited Rogers to share his personal
draft act based on the Vestal Bill. This draft became the basis of the Trademark Act of
1946. See The Vestal Bill, H.R. 7118, 72d Cong. (1st Sess. 1931); Sondra Levine, Part
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conception of unfair competition was not then a feature of U.S. law.
Nevertheless, in a strategy that is still utilized by U.S. intellectual
property treaty negotiators today, U.S. law was touted as a model
for all jurisdictions in the Americas to follow. 132 After the convention
was finalized but before it was ratified, the U.S. delegation produced
a public relations document titled The Advantages Accruing to
American Citizens from the General Convention for Trademark and
Commercial Protection. 133 In it, the U.S. delegation highlights the
treaty’s protections against unfair competition. It states that the
convention “extends through Latin America common law principles
of honest trading which have been enforced in the United States for
forty years under the elastic jurisdiction of our equity courts.” 134 No
doubt this argument that the protections in the act were already the
law in the United States was also employed in negotiating the
convention.
B. Unfair Competition in the
Inter-American Convention
Chapter IV of the convention is titled “Repression of Unfair
Competition” and sets out both broad and detailed protections
against acts of unfair competition that went well beyond the then
existing protection under U.S. common law, statutory law in any of
the member states, and international convention. 135 In addition to
One: The Common Law, the States, and Historical perspectives: The Origins of the
Lanham Act, 19 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 22, 24-25 (2010).
132

See Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International
Intellectual Property Protection, U. Ottawa L. & Tech. 125, 143-47 (2004) (discussing the
“bilateralism” strategy used by the United States wherein bilateral commercial treaties
are “used as instruments of foreign relations by the United States” in extending
international intellectual property protections.).

133

Press Release, U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Convention, The Advantages
Accruing to American Citizens from the General Convention for Trademark and
Commercial Protection 2 (Feb. 11, 1929).

134

Id.

135

Chapter IV of the Inter-American Convention states that “[e]very act or deed contrary to
commercial good faith or to the normal and honorable development of industrial or
business activities shall be considered as unfair competition and, therefore, unjust and
prohibited” and lists acts that “are declared to be acts of unfair competition” including:
(a) Acts calculated directly or indirectly to represent that the goods or business
of a manufacturer, industrialist, merchant or agriculturist are the goods or
business of another manufacturer, industrialist, merchant or agriculturist of
any of the other Contracting States, whether such representation be made by
the appropriation or simulation of trade marks, symbols, distinctive names,
the imitation of labels, wrappers, containers, commercial names, or other
means of identification;
(b) The use of false descriptions of goods, by words, symbols or other means
tending to deceive the public in the country where the acts occur, with respect
to the nature, quality, or utility of the goods;
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the protections in this chapter, trade names—that species of
unregistered marks addressed in U.S. unfair competition law—are
protected in Chapter III, and “false indications of geographical
origin or source” are protected in Chapter V. Unfair competition
thus pervades the convention.
The chapter on unfair competition sets out specific acts that are
“declared to be acts of unfair competition” and therefore
“prohibited.” 136 These include:
Acts calculated directly or indirectly to represent that the
goods or business of a manufacturer, industrialist, merchant
or agriculturist are the goods or business of another
manufacturer, industrialist, merchant or agriculturist of any
of the other Contracting States, whether such representation
be made by the appropriation or simulation of trade marks,
symbols, distinctive names, the imitation of labels, wrappers,
containers, commercial names, or other means of
identification. 137
This prohibition is obviously based on passing off, but is
formulated more expansively than contemporary U.S. law. 138
Actionable conduct includes misrepresentation of the origin of goods
“indirectly,” and requires merely a “simulation.” There appears to
be no requirement of direct competition, economic injury, or proof of
a likelihood of consumer confusion. The protection applies not only
to goods, but also to a trader’s “business” and may therefore reach
services. Finally, protection is not limited to devices that would
constitute protectable unregistered marks. For instance, the only
“means of identification” that is qualified by “distinctive,” is
“names.” Presumably, others means of identification could be
descriptive and yet still be protected.
In addition to the Inter-American Convention and Protocol, the
1929 Pan-American Trademark Convention adopted 12 resolutions,
which were annexed to the Final Act. The Seventh Resolution was
a “Declaration of Principles on Unfair Trade Practices,” stating:
(c) The use of false indications of geographical origin or source of goods, by words,
symbols, or other means which tend in that respect to deceive the public in
the country in which these acts occur; [and]
(d) To sell, or offer for sale to the public an article, product or merchandise of such
form or appearance that even though it does not bear directly or indirectly an
indication of origin or source, gives or produces, either by pictures,
ornaments, or language employed in the text, the impression of being a
product, article or commodity originating, manufactured or produced in one
of the other Contracting States.
Inter-American Convention, supra, note 8, at 2934.
136

Id.

137

Id. at 2932.

138

It is possible that “calculated” implies an intent requirement.
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That every act including breach of contract without just
cause or which discredits the products or methods of a
competitor; commercial bribery; enticing employees of a
competitor to obtain confidential information with respect to
his activities; false use of testimonials, warrant and
appointments and false statements of membership in
associations; and in general every act which tends to secure
the patronage of a competitor through intimidation or
coercion, is declared unfair and fraudulent. 139
According to this resolution, the delegates’ view of unfair
competition was expansive and extended beyond source confusion
and false advertising. The convention details proscribed acts and yet
state protections broadly rather than as technical rules, which could
be evaded by crafty “parasites,” as Rogers repeatedly called them. 140
The text also formulated large areas of rights not previously
addressed by U.S. law, such as geographical indications
protection. 141
The convention remains the strongest commitment to unfair
competition protection in international law to date. The specificity
and breadth of protections against unfair competition contained in
the Inter-American Convention distinguish it from other
international agreements. The Paris Convention did not provide any
protection against unfair competition until the 1900 revision, 142 and
that text merely stated that such protection should exist. Not until
1925 did the convention attempt to delineate acts of unfair
competition. The 1925 text proclaimed that “[a]ll acts contrary to
honest usage in industrial or commercial matters” and “[a]cts of any
139

Final Act, General Inter-American Convention for Trade-mark and Commercial
Protection, Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, 124 L.N.T.S. 357.

140

See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 97, at 76 (“[i]n the ordinary affairs of life the average
business man takes reasonable precautions, but when it comes to adopting a trade-mark
. . . upon something which he may own and he may not—which may be his exclusive
property and which he may have to share with every conscienceless parasite with more
covetousness than decency”). Rogers uses the term “parasite” twelve times in his book.
Id. at 82, 125, 135, 137, 158, 161, 203, 229, 264, 275, 281; see also Edward S. Rogers,
Ingenuity of the Infringer and the Courts, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 358, 363 (1913); Rogers, supra
note 32, at 128; Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act,
supra note 103, at 257.

141

See Christine Haight Farley, The Pan-American Trademark Convention of 1929: A Bold
Vision of Extraterritorial Meets Current Realities, in Trademark Protection and
Territoriality: Challenges in the Global Economy 58, 64-67 (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee
eds., 2014).

142

International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, Dec. 14,
1900, 32 Stat. 1936, 1940 (revised at Brussels) (“Those entitled of right under the
Convention (art. 2 and 3), shall enjoy, in all the States of the Union, the protection
accorded to citizens or subjects against unfair competition.”). That provision was revised
in 1911 to read: “All the contracting countries agree to assure to the members of the
Union an effective protection against unfair competition.” International Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, 1663 (revised at
Washington).
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kind whatsoever tending in any way to create confusion with the
merchandise or products of a competitor” 143 constitute unfair
competition. Thus, at that time under the Paris Convention,
actionable conduct must be dishonest as per industry practice, 144
between competitors, and cause consumer confusion. Intriguingly,
none of these limitations were included in the Inter-American
Convention drafted four years later. Although Article 10bis of the
Paris Convention was subsequently revised in 1934 and 1958, these
limitations persist. 145
In addition to providing stronger and more detailed protections
against unfair competition than the Paris Convention, the InterAmerican Convention also resolved one of the most vexing issues for
intellectual property owners by providing them with an effective
means of enforcing the rights granted in the treaty. Like the Paris
Convention, the Inter-American Convention states: “Each of the
Contracting States, in which it does not yet exist, hereby agrees to
establish a protective service, for the suppression of unfair
competition . . . .” 146 This obligation resembles the approach of other
international treaties to enact domestic laws where necessary to
ensure the rights granted by the treaty will be given effect in each
contracting state. Under this approach, intellectual property owners
are at the mercy of member states to fulfill their obligations. In
contrast with these other treaties, however, the Inter-American
Convention anticipates member states’ dereliction. Article 21
143

See International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, Nov.
6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789 (modified at The Hague); International Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748. The minutes of
the Hague Conference that produced this revision indicate that “any means whatever”
should include: “marks, registered or not, commercial names, names of business houses,
titles of printed matter, get-up of goods, form of packages, shop signs—briefly, all signs
used by a manufacturer or merchant to distinguish his trade and his merchandise from
those of his competitors and also allegations relating to the origin of the products or
merchandise.” See Ladas, supra note 104, at 1706.

144

Compare the Paris Convention’s insistence on dishonesty with the Inter-American
Convention’s language: “contrary to commercial good faith or to the normal and
honorable development of industrial or business activities.” Inter-American Convention,
supra note 8, at 2930 (art. 20). Even though the French phrase “concurrence déloyale”
was translated into “unfair competition,” “déloyale” is more accurately translated as
“fraudulent” than “unfair,” which would suggest a higher threshold. See Christopher
Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation (3d ed.
2004).

145

G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property: As Revised at Stockholm in 1967 (1968). Art. 10bis presently
provides the following example of an act of unfair competition: “all acts of such a nature
as to create confusion by any means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the
industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor.” See International Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, 139.
An attempt to remove the restriction of the protection to competitors was defeated at the
1958 Lisbon Conference. Wadlow, supra note 144, at 60.

146

Inter-American Convention, supra note 8, at 2940.

Vol. 110 TMR

767

proclaims that “unless otherwise effectively dealt with under the
domestic laws of the Contracting States,” acts of unfair competition
“shall be repressed under the provisions of this Convention.” 147
Furthermore, Article 22 states that “[t]he Contracting States which
may not yet have enacted legislation repressing the acts of unfair
competition . . . , shall apply to such acts the penalties contained in
their legislation on trade marks . . . and shall grant relief by way of
injunction against the continuance of said acts at the request of any
party injured; those causing such injury shall also be answerable in
damages to the injured party.” 148
These provisions establish that these protections are to be given
immediate effect even in the absence of relevant domestic
legislation. The protections against unfair competition are thus
framed as self-executing. The prohibited acts are sufficiently
described in the convention and the remedies provided in existing
trademark legislation shall be available. In addition, the convention
includes an “answerable in damages” clause. This provision
mandates a civil remedy; something not required by the Paris
Convention. 149 The convention was prescient and pragmatic. With
the exception of the United States, all of the member states were
civil law countries that depend on a code to provide rights.
The convention was thus pioneering beyond articulating new
protections against unfair competition. Ladas and Rogers later
stated that the protections achieved in the Inter-American
Convention were superior to those achieved in the Paris
Convention. 150 It is not surprising that they would have exceeded
the Paris Convention protections. The freedom they had to create
new protections whole cloth in the Inter-American Convention was
unparalleled. They were not constrained by the need to reconcile
conflicting legal standards across jurisdictions. They instead were
working from a blank slate; the other states had no law of unfair
competition. 151 They were also operating without even the normal
constraints in a treaty development since most of the Latin
American delegates were diplomats, not trademark experts. In
addition, the environment was hospitable to creativity. Previous
147

Id. at 2932 (emphasis added).

148

Id. at 2934.

149

See Wadlow, supra note 144, at 59.

150

Edward S. Rogers & Stephen P. Ladas, Proposal for Uniform Trademark Laws, 40 TMR
8, 14 (1950) (“It embodies international legislation on trade-marks, trade names,
indications of origin, and unfair competition in some respects superior to that achieved
by the European International Union foe the Protection of Industrial Property.”)
(emphasis in original).

151

Id.; see also Ladas, supra note 119, at 52 (“Inasmuch as there has not been a long
preparation and continuity of study of these questions in all the American countries, it
is reasonable to make use of the experience acquired but other countries in dealing with
the same problems.”).
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Pan-American Conventions had already served as a creative space
for the development of new solutions for trademark owners, such as
the creation of a Pan-American trademark registration and priority
based on protection in another member state. 152
The convention provided Rogers unrestricted freedom to draft
his ideal set of unfair competition protections and his concern was
solely for U.S. traders. Rogers had developed an international
perspective on trademark protection and had in mind various ways
that U.S. trademarks owners were vulnerable internationally. 153 In
his book anticipating the 1929 Pan-American Conference, Ladas
stated that “[w]hat American manufacturers and traders . . . need
especially today is . . . a more effective and complete protection.” 154
The Inter-American Convention provided Rogers and Ladas
with a blank canvas to think big about trademark and unfair
competition protections, which contrasted sharply with the domestic
legislative environment. There may not, however, have been reason
at that time to seriously contemplate the convention’s impact on
U.S. law. It was unlikely that there would be any plaintiffs hailing
from member states that would utilize the convention in U.S.
federal courts, and the legal environment in the United States in
the 1930s was general inhospitable to the expansion of rights.
Within a decade later, however, two Supreme Court decisions,
which will unfold in the next sections, would shift the outlook on the
protections contained in the Inter-American Convention. The first
was Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, which wiped out all of the then existing
common law of unfair competition in 1938. 155 The second was the
Court’s decision in Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech in 1940,
which declared the Inter-American Convention to be self-executing.
C. The Inter-American Convention Today
Given its undisputed success and its novelty, it is puzzling that
most trademark lawyers today are unfamiliar with the InterAmerican Convention. After all, the convention has neither been
superseded nor denounced, but remains valid and in force today in
the United States and in every one of the original contracting
152

Convention for the Protection of Commercial, Industrial and Agricultural Trade Marks
and Commercial Names, Apr. 28, 1923, 44 Stat. 2494; Convention for the Protection of
Trade Marks, Aug. 20, 1910, 39 Stat. 1675; see also Farley, supra note 141, at 64-67.

153

At an international conference in 1930, Rogers described “a prevailing sport” in other
countries where “‘two or three people . . . get together and start a company under the
name of Coca Cola. Then the Coca Cola firm gets into that country and finds a company
under that name already there, with the result that the firm has either to change the
name or buy the company.’” Hanna Katz, An International Aspect of the Pending TradeMark Bill, 35 TMR 146, 148 (1945).

154

Ladas, supra note 119, at 34.

155

McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 27.7 (“the 1938 Erie Railroad Supreme Court decision, . . .
it was widely felt, had eliminated the existing body of federal unfair competition law.”).
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states. 156 It is not as if the United States has not signed so many
multilateral trademark treaties that this convention is getting lost
in a crowd. 157 The convention’s lack of notoriety would be
understandable if its provisions had been reiterated in other
international agreements or in the Lanham Act. But this is not the
case; the Inter-American Convention provides some of the strongest
trademark protections seen in any international agreement to date
as well as some fairly radical trademark rights. 158 Foreign case law
suggests that the convention has not been forgotten in member
states and has therefore played a very different role abroad. 159
156

Id. The United States did, however, formally renounce the convention’s Protocol on the
Inter-American Registration of Trade-marks in 1945. Stephen P. Ladas, The Lanham
Act and International Trade, 14 Law & Contemp. Probs. 269, 271 (1949).

157

The United States is party to only six multilateral agreements on trademark law, and
most are much more recent: the Paris Convention; the Inter-American Convention; the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS
Agreement”); the Trademark Law Treaty; the Singapore Treaty; and the Madrid
Protocol. U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States in Force on Jan. 1, 2019, 520 (2019).

158

The convention’s exceptions to territoriality are inventive and replicated nowhere else.
Farley, supra note 141, at 64-67. The convention’s protections for geographical
indications and against unfair competition are the most sweeping in any agreement to
which the United States is a party to date. See Christine Haight Farley, The Protection
of Geographical Indications in the Inter-American Convention on Trademarks, 6 WIPO
J. 68, 70 (2014); Christine Haight Farley, Looking Beyond the Known Story: How the
Prehistory of GI Protection in the Americas Provides an Alternate Approach, in
Geographical Indications at the Crossroads of Trade, Development and Culture in AsiaPacific 212, 212-13 (Irene Calboli & Loy Wee Loon eds., 2017).

159

The convention is still effectively invoked on behalf of U.S. trademark owners in other
member states. See, e.g., Colombia: Superintendency of Industry and Commerce of
Colombia, Resolution of October 11, 2011 (cancelling Colombian registration for CROSS
FIT under the convention based on registration in the U.S.); Superintendency of Industry
and Commerce of Colombia, Resolution No. 4328 of February 20, 2001 (cancelling
Colombian registration for HAWAIIAN TROPIC under the convention since the mark
was previously registered in member state Ecuador and registrant had knowledge);
Guatemala: Exclusividades Finas, Sociedad Anónima v. Inversiones San Agustin,
Sociedad Anónima, Case 59-94, Supreme Court of Justice (1994) (cancelling Guatemalan
registration for OSHKOSH B’GOSH as contravening the convention due to the prior
registration by Oshkosh B’Gosh Inc. in the United States); Midas International
Corporation v. Jorge Oswaldo Urrutia Lamas, Case 69-95, Supreme Court of Justice
(1995) (cancelling Guatemalan registration for MIDAS as contravening the convention
due to the existence of prior rights in the United States); Antonio Malouf Gabriel v.
Calvin Klein, Supreme Court of Justice (1999) (cancelling Guatemalan registration for
CALVIN KLEIN as contravening the Convention based on prior rights in the United
States); Nicaragua: Decision No. 94, 10:45 AM, July 12, 1996 (unpublished) (cancelling
Nicaraguan registration for SUR under the convention based on prior registration in
member state Panama); Panama: Appeal from Resolution No. 106 of December 16, 1993,
of the General Directorate of Interior Commerce of the Ministry of Commerce (Supreme
Court of Justice, September 9, 1994) (cancelling Panamanian registration for FOOT
LOCKER under the convention based on prior U.S. registration for the identical mark
for the same goods and the notoriousness of the mark); Saks & Company v. Saks Zona
Libre, S.A., Ministry of Commerce, Resolution 39 of June 2, 1995 (cancelling
Panamanian registration for SAKS FIFTH AVENUE under the convention based Saks
& Company’s prior registration of the mark in the U.S.); Resolution No. 94, June 8, 1994
(cancelling Panamanian registration for VOGUE under the convention based on prior
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The Inter-American Convention may have been forgotten
because, over the years, some ambiguity has arisen as to its force.
The specific rights contained in the convention were never codified
in the Lanham Act. At first glance, that fact may seem curious since
Rogers drafted the Lanham Act and was in the best position to
include the convention’s provisions. It behooves us then to consider
why the convention was not implemented in this manner.
The main reason may be that Rogers understood the convention
to be self-executing, meaning that the convention’s substantive
provisions can be given legal effect in U.S. courts without any action
taken by the legislature to make the treaty operative. 160 The case
for the convention being self-executing is strong. 161 First, it does not
contain language indicating that it is not self-executing, as some
treaties do. On the contrary, the convention states that “The
provisions of the Convention shall have the force of law in those
States in which international treaties possess that character, as
soon as they are ratified by their constitutional organs.” 162
Moreover, in most instances, such as the provisions on unfair
competition, the rights are so specific and detailed that direct
judicial application is enabled without the need of implementing
legislation. 163
The most powerful argument that the treaty is self-executing,
however, is that the Supreme Court has so held. In Bacardi Corp. of
America v. Domenech, in a unanimous opinion, the Court held that
“[t]his treaty on ratification became a part of our law. No special
legislation in the United States was necessary to make it
effective.” 164

registration in member state Colombia); Resolution No. 147, August 9, 1994 (cancelling
Panamanian registration for LAMBORGHINI under the convention based on prior
registration in the United States); Resolution No. 147, August 9, 1994 (cancelling
Panamanian registration for CREAMETTE under the convention based on prior
registration in the United States); Resolution No. 147, August 9, 1994 (cancelling
Panamanian registration for JAGUAR under the convention based on prior registration
in the United States); Resolution No. 69, April 20, 1994 (cancelling Panamanian
registration for GAP under the convention based on prior registration in the United
States).
160

See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008) (“What we mean by ‘self-executing’
is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect upon ratification. Conversely, a ‘non-selfexecuting’ treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law.”).

161

The purpose here is not to demonstrate that the treaty is self-executing and would be so
recognized by a court today, but instead to demonstrate that Rogers would have been
convinced that the treat was self-executing in 1946.

162

See Inter-American Convention, supra note 8, at 2941 (art. 35).

163

Courts have rejected claims by foreign parties asserting rights under the Paris
Convention’s unfair competition provisions. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296
F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2002); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez De Arriortua, 948 F.
Supp. 684, 688 (E.D. Mich. 1996).

164

311 U.S. 150, 162-163 (1940).
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The drafter of the Lanham Act would have been the most
familiar with the Bacardi case. He both briefed and argued the case
before the Supreme Court. 165 In fact it was he who suggested to the
Court, and ultimately convinced it, that the Inter-American
Convention was self-executing. 166 If there was ever any doubt in his
mind that the convention would not be accepted by the courts as
self-executing, the Supreme Court laid that doubt to rest in 1940,
just six years prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act.
The self-executing status of the treaty may in part explain why
its protections were not explicitly included in Rogers’s draft of the
Lanham Act. Although anomalous today, it is important to
remember that our expectation that treaties be implemented by
legislation is of a fairly recent origin. Self-executing treaties fell into
disfavor in the years just following enactment of the Lanham Act. 167
In 1929, therefore, Rogers’s expectation that the treaty would be
self-executing would have been sound.
V. THE DEATH OF COMMON LAW
UNFAIR COMPETITION
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the common
law to trademark and unfair competition law before the 1946
Lanham Act. Because under the 1905 Trademark Act only the
owners of technical trademarks were granted rights, which were
highly constrained, 168 any other rights were governed exclusively by
common law. 169 Although unfair competition cases could not be
165

Id.

166

In the petitioner’s brief, he stated: “No special legislation implementing this treaty is
necessary in the United States” Brief for Petitioner at 26, Bacardi Corp. of America v.
Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940) (No. 21).

167

Restatement, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) 56 (1987)
(“Self-executing treaties were contemplated by the Constitution and have been common.
They avoid delay in carrying out the obligations of the United States. They eliminate the
need for participation by the House of Representatives (which the Framers of the
Constitution had excluded from the treaty process), and for going to the Senate a second
time for implementing legislation after the Senate had already consented to the treaty
by two-thirds vote.”). The attitudinal shift on self-execution occurred around 1952 in
response to a case in which the legality of the wartime internment of Japanese
Americans was challenged under the United Nations Charter, whose obligations were
argued to be self-executing. See Sei Fujii v. State of California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722 (1952).
The case provoked the so-called “Bricker Amendments” proposed by conservative
Members of Congress that would require Congressional approval of all self-executing
treaties. David L. Sloss, The Death of Treaty Supremacy: An Invisible Constitutional
Change 237-38 (2016). The amendments failed (by a single vote), but the Senate debates
helped “solidify a consensus within the federal political branches supporting [a non-selfexecuting] exception to the treaty supremacy rule.” Id. at 231. The attitude toward selfexecuting treaties was changed for good.

168

Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 728.

169

Bartholomew Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, Law & Contemp.
Prob. 200, 202 (1949).
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heard in federal court unless there was diversity jurisdiction, this
was increasingly the case as commerce expanded. 170 In both
trademark and unfair competition cases heard in federal courts,
judges typically paid only “lip-service to the rule that substantive
rights in trade-marks rested upon the laws of the several states.” 171
As a result, “a great body of federal law was built up with no
apparent regard for state precedents.” 172 In contrast, “the common
law of the states was uncertain and unsatisfactory, largely because
of the scarcity of precedents.” 173 Consequently, unfair competition
law was governed almost exclusively by federal common law. 174
The landmark decision in 1938 in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 175 thus
had major implications for trademark and unfair competition law.
Ruling that “[t]here is no federal general common law,” 176 the
Supreme Court overturned decades of federal common law. The
impact of Erie for trademark and unfair competition law was not
merely, as in other areas of law, that several pre-1938 decisions lost
their precedential significance. Rather, in trademark law, the Erie
doctrine potentially left an utter void. 177
A coincidence may have initially blunted the blow of Erie for
unfair competition law. Less than seven months after issuing the
decision in Erie, the Supreme Court decided an important unfair
competition case: Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. 178 Notably,
Justice Brandeis, who authored the majority opinion in Erie, also
wrote the majority opinion in Kellogg. Adding further significance
to the cast of characters, Rogers represented Kellogg, the defendantpetitioner in the case. Surprisingly, the 159-page brief filed in
170

Id.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id. at 201; see also Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act,
supra note 103, at 259 (“It was frequently found that there were no applicable State
decisions or that the decisions in the States comprising the same circuit were not
uniform.”).

174

Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair
Competition, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 955, 960-61 (1942) (“In the domain of trade-marks and
unfair competition, the loss of this important body of decisional law will be keener and
greater than is likely to occur in most other fields, due to the fact that the federal courts
have been the usual forum for such litigation.”).

175

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

176

Id. at 78.

177

Philco Corporation v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1943) (“there has
been a federal general common law and cases have been ‘governed by federal law’ within
the meaning of the Erie doctrine, for federal courts have exercised independent judgment
as to what ‘the common law’ was in all cases in the field.”) (emphasis added); Rogers,
New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act, supra note 103, at 259
(“there was chaos”).

178

305 U. S. 111 (1938). The Supreme Court decided Erie v. Tompkins on April 25, 1938,
and Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. on November 14, 1938.

Vol. 110 TMR

773

September of 1938 on behalf of Kellogg never mentions the five
month-old Erie decision nor does it attack the lower court’s ruling
for relying on federal common law. 179 Justice Brandeis, however, did
explicitly address the impact of the Court’s ruling in Erie in the first
footnote of the majority opinion, stating that “[m]ost of the issues in
the case involve questions of common law and hence are within the
scope of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). But no claim
has been made that the local law is any different from the general
law on the subject, and both parties have relied almost entirely on
federal precedents.” 180
As the case had by then been litigated for a decade, 181 it would
have been late in the case to reconceive it under state law, especially
with such short notice. But because there was no “local law” to rely
on—at least in the pleadings, the theory of the case did not need to
be altered. The reasoning in the Kellogg Court’s first footnote thus
provided a large loophole to avoid the Erie doctrine in unfair
competition cases, and the Erie doctrine would appear to have lost
some of its thrust in this area within a year.
Another coincidence: a mere three weeks after the Kellogg
decision, the Supreme Court decided yet another unfair competition
case, 182 and again Rogers was involved, this time representing the
plaintiff-respondent. Remarkably, seven and a half months after
ruling in Erie that federal courts are required to apply the law of the
state in which they sit, the Court again reached its decision relying
only on federal common law. 183 Significantly, the Court decided that
the invalidity of a trademark registration does not divest a federal
court of its jurisdiction over a claim of unfair competition. In doing
so, the Court opened an avenue for greater jurisdiction over unfair
competition cases. 184 A federal court having jurisdiction over an
unfair competition claim, however, does not settle the question of
what law controls. The Court went on to state that “[t]he remedy for
unfair competition is that given by the common law,” 185 relying
exclusively on its opinion in a 1901 decision. 186 Thus, within a year
179

Brief for Petitioner at 1, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).

180

305 U.S. at 113 n.1.

181

See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co., 26 F.2d 284 (D. Conn. 1928).

182

Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. NuEnamel Corp. 305 U. S. 315 (1938) (decided on
December 5, 1938).

183

Diggins, supra note 169, at 204 (stating that the Court failed to “cite a single state
decision [or] refer to state law”).

184

305 U. S. at 319 (“[i]f it is not a properly registered trade-mark, the ground is unfair
competition at common law. The facts supporting a suit for infringement and one for
unfair competition are substantially the same. They constitute and make plain the
wrong complained of, the violation of the right to exclusive use.”).

185

305 U. S. at 320 (citing Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901)).

186

Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901).
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of its Erie decision, the Court enunciates the basis of an unfair
competition claim relying entirely on federal common law.
Such opinions, however, belie the extent to which the law of
unfair competition was on unstable ground following Erie. The
impact of Erie set in gradually. For instance, eight months after
Kellogg, the Seventh Circuit decided an unfair competition case 187
“without reference to Illinois law . . . basing its decision exclusively
upon decisions of the federal courts.” 188 Two years later, however,
that same court, relying on Erie, reversed the district’s ruling in
favor of the plaintiff’s unfair competition claim, 189 and criticized the
district court for “decid[ing] the case upon general Federal law.” 190
It may have taken this long for the defense bar to realize the
potential of Erie. 191
Such decisions would have sent shockwaves through the
trademark bar. 192 At best, after 1938, trademark and unfair
competition cases faced the difficult hurdle maintaining their
reliance on the substantive rights offered by federal law. 193 The
Second Circuit nicely summed up the state of the law at that time:
Until the advent of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, . . . federal law
was accepted as controlling issues of both trademark
infringement and unfair competition. But since the advent of
the energetic doctrine which takes its name from that case
the situation has been confused. Some vigorous judicial
claims are still heard for a uniform law; but the major view
at least nods in the direction of a state rule, usually hazy,
before resorting to the more complete and pertinent federal
precedents. 194
If trademark owners were required to find their cause of action
and remedy under state law alone, they would be left wanting. Post1938, therefore, there was a strong sense among trademark
practitioners that both state and federal rights in trademark and
187

Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939).

188

Diggins, supra note 169, at 204.

189

Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Am. Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 706 (7th
Cir. 1942).

190

Id. at 708.

191

The Seventh Circuit admonished the district court for not considering the “defendant’s
contention that under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . the law of the state, as announced by
its courts, must be given effect.” Id. The court then proceeded to rule that under state
law, actionable unfair competition was limited to passing off and that a claim for the
misappropriation of a business system could not succeed. Id.

192

Chafee, supra note 21, at 1299 (“This valuable body of law is now likely to be torn into
pieces because of the Tompkins case.”).

193

As late as 1980, the Ninth Circuit announced in a trademark case: “Save as an outgrowth
of federal statutory or constitutional law, there is no federal common law.” Int’l Order of
Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1980).

194

Dad’s Root Beer Co. v. Doc’s Bevs., 193 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1951).
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unfair competition was “woefully inadequate.” 195 Not only were
federal common law rights in flux, but federal trademark legislation
had never offered much protection to traders. Rogers’s congressional
testimony summed up the sentiment of the trademark bar: “we now
have a rather confused situation which is difficult to understand . . .
it is hard for anyone to find out what the Federal statutory law is,
because it is so badly scattered.” 196 It had long been the consensus
of the trademark bar that trademark law was due for an overhaul. 197
VI. THE 1946 LANHAM ACT
The trademark bar was dissatisfied with 1905 and 1920
trademark acts almost as soon as they were enacted, and frustration
only increased over the decades before the passage of the Lanham
Act in 1946. 198 The push for a revised trademark act was fueled by
the belief that the existing laws put U.S. trademark owners at a
disadvantage internationally because of the significant hurdles they
faced obtaining a registration. 199
The origins of the 1946 Lanham Act date as far back as 1921
when Rogers debuted his first draft. 200 These efforts stalled until
1938 when the first of the bills by Congressman Fritz Lanham, for
whom the act was named, were introduced. 201
195

Diggins, supra note 169, at 203.

196

Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on
Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1939) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4744] (Statement
by Rogers).

197

Diggins, supra note 169, at 210.

198

Edward S. Rogers, Some Suggestions Concerning a Trade-Mark Registration Act, 43rd
Conf. Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 398, 414 (1920) (“No one, I think, will dispute the assertion that
our present act, like its predecessors, is a slovenly piece of legislation, characterized by
awkward phraseology, bad grammar and involved sentences. Its draftsmen had a talent
for obscurity amounting to genius.”).

199

Report of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association 412-22 (1920).

200

Rogers’s 1924 draft was the first to become a bill. See S. 2679, 68th Cong. (1st Sess. 1924).
Derenberg states that the 1924 draft was “the continuation of trademark law revision
efforts which began as far back as the year 1920” and “the real origin of much of what
was subsequently included in the Act of 1946 derives from a now famous address by
Edward S. Rogers before the American Bar Association in 1921.” Derenberg, supra note
105, at 189.

201

H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. (1st Sess. 1938). After Rep. Lanham introduced H.R. 9041, six
subsequent bills were considered before H.R. 1654 was finally passed. See H.R. 4744,
76th Cong. (1st Sess. 1939), reprinted in Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the
Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. (1st Sess. 1 1939);
H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. (1st Sess. 1939), reprinted in Patents and Trade-Marks: Hearings
on H.R. 6618 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. (1st Sess. 1 1939); H.R.
102, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 1941), reprinted in Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R.
5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents,
77th Cong. (1st Sess. 2 1941); S. 895, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 1941), reprinted in House
Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895; H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 1941),
reprinted in House Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895, at 14; H.R. 82, 78th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1943), reprinted in Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the House
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In 1949, in a case handled by Rogers’s firm, Judge Learned Hand
notes the Lanham Act’s success in rectifying the former issues in
federal trademark law. Judge Hand declares that the Lanham Act
“did indeed put federal trade-mark law upon a new footing” as “it is
no longer open to doubt that the present act created rights uniform
throughout the Union.” 202 He then, however, rather portentously
continued, “[c]learly a change, and a most substantial change, was
intended, and the question is what that was.” 203
As to what Congress did intend to change, one could look to the
act itself where Congress is uncharacteristically explicit in its
legislative objective:
The intent of this Act is to regulate commerce within the
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and
misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect
registered marks used in such commerce from interference
by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged
in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent
fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of
registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies
stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names and unfair competition entered into
between the United States and foreign nations. 204
This language is unambiguous: Among other things, Congress
both intended to offer unfair competition protection and to
effectuate treaty rights. Congress’s intent thus mirrored Rogers’s.
Curiously, however, Rogers’s approach seems to have been to
achieve both objectives indirectly rather than directly. 205
Today, we accept that unfair competition protection is provided in
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Contrary to contemporary
understanding, however, the legislative history of the Lanham Act
reveals that neither Rogers nor Congress intended for Section
43(a) to be the vehicle for federal unfair competition protection in
the Lanham Act. Instead, Rogers intended for Section 44—his
brainchild—to provide federal unfair competition protection.

Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943). Activity on the bill was stalled until after
World War II and was finally passed on July 5, 1946. McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 5:4.
202

S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860
(1949).

203

175 F.2d at 178.

204

Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 45, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (emphasis
added).

205

Ladas, supra note 104, at 1702.
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The phrase “unfair competition” appears only twice in the act:
In addition to the intent clause quoted above, 206 it appears in
Section 44(h). Therefore, in both places where the phrase appears,
it is connected to treaty rights. Section 44 was included in the act to
incorporate by reference the stipulations of certain provisions of the
Paris Convention and the Inter-American Convention. 207 The 1946
text of Section 44(b) mentioned both by name, although a 1962
housekeeping revision has since replaced the direct references to
these treaties with the generalized “any convention or treaty
relating to trademarks.” 208
Section 44(h) provides that certain foreign nationals 209 “shall be
entitled to effective protection against unfair competition, and the
remedies provided . . . for infringement of marks shall be available
. . . in repressing acts of unfair competition.” 210 In addition,
Section 44(g) provides that the “trade names” of such foreign
nationals “shall be protected without the obligation of filing or
registration whether or not they form parts of marks.” Finally,
Section 44(i) extends these “same benefits” beyond treaty
beneficiaries to “citizens or residents of the United States.” 211

206

In Section 45, Congress states its intent to “provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition
entered into between the United States and foreign nations.” Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127.

207

Ladas, supra note 104, at 1702 n.119.

208

See Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 20, 76 Stat. 769, 774. Nevertheless, the
meaning remains unchanged.

209

See Trademark Act of 1946, § 44(b), 60 Stat. 427, 442 (“Persons who are nationals of,
domiciled in, or have a bona fide and effective business or commercial establishment in
any foreign country, which is a party to (1) the International Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, signed at Paris on March 20, 1883; or (2) the General
Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection signed at
Washington on February 20, 1929; or (3) any other convention or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair competition to which the
United States is a party, shall be entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of
this Act to the extent and under the conditions essential to give effect to any such
conventions and treaties so long as the United States shall continue to be a party thereto,
except as provided in the following paragraphs of this section.”).

210

Lanham Act § 44(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h) (“Any person designated in paragraph (b) of this
section as entitled to the benefits and subject to the provision of this Act shall be entitled
to effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided herein for
infringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in repressing
acts of unfair competition.”). Initially, that subsection read, “All acts of unfair
competition in commerce are declared to be unlawful and the provisions of section 32 to
35 inclusive shall be applcable [sic] thereto.” Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at
163.

211

Lanham Act § 44(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(i) (“Citizens or residents of the United States shall
have the same benefits as are granted by this section to persons described in
paragraph (b) hereof.”).
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A. Legislative History Lessons

An earlier iteration of the provision that ultimately was enacted
as subsection 44(h) boldly stated “All acts of unfair competition in
commerce are declared to be unlawful and the provisions of sections
32 to 35 inclusive shall be applicable thereto.” 212 Although this
subsection appeared in “Title IX—International Conventions,” it
was not otherwise hinged to treaty beneficiaries.
In a 1939 hearing on the bill that contained that language, three
trademark practitioners appearing as witnesses—Thomson, Byerly,
and Luce—each expressed concern over the breadth of claims that
would be enabled by this provision. Thomson noted that this
subsection “covers a very wide field, and its construction has given
jurisdiction to the Federal courts in any case involving unfair
competition.” 213
Rogers, also a witness, but seemingly one holding court,
defended the provision by arguing that our treaty obligations
required it. He stated that “[b]y all the conventions we undertake to
grant the foreigners effective protection against unfair competition.
The foreigner says, ‘What have you given us?’ . . . Then you talk to
a foreigner about the common law, and he says, ‘What is that? We
haven’t any such thing in our country.’ And then we try to explain
that there are 48 varieties of common law in the United States, and
he says, ‘Which one is the one that I am entitled to be protected
under? There is no Federal statute that helps me.’” 214 He stated the
consequence was that “because we haven’t put it in some kind of
Federal statute . . . , our people are being refused protection abroad
because there is no reciprocity.” 215
This legislative history reveals the relationship of Sections 44
and 43(a). The provision that ultimately became Section 43(a) was
initially more limited. Its enlargement occurred only as a result of a
suggestion offered by one of these witnesses not intended to enlarge
unfair competition protection, but to restrict it. The suggestion was
made because the witness was concerned that Rogers’s unfair
competition provision was “dangerously broad.” 216
The witness Byerly suggested that the provision that ultimately
became Section 43(a) was the more appropriate place to deal with
unfair competition. 217 He suggested making the protections clearer
in that section rather than adding confusion with “this rather vague
section [44(h)] which has been put in later, which apparently does
212

See H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. § 45(g) (1939).

213

Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 164 (Statement by Thomson).

214

Id. (Statement by Rogers).

215

Id.

216

See Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 167 (Statement by Byerly).

217

Id. at 165 (Statement by Byerly).
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not require you to have registration, and therefore it is difficult to
see how you have any Federal law at all.” 218 Byerly’s proposal was
that the act simply state a cause of action for passing off available
to trademark registrants. 219 His comments evidence an exceedingly
narrow conception of unfair competition, but Rogers did not contest
it. Curiously, Rogers stated that “Mr. Byerly has drafted an
admirable definition of unfair competition.” 220 He went on, however,
to state that “unfair competition is what Louis [sic] Carroll used to
like to call a ‘portmanteau’ word—it means a lot of things, and it
means different things to different people, and the minute you
attempt to define it you limit it.” 221 Byerly proposed that then
Section 32 include a claim for “any person who falsely indicates to
the public that any goods or articles are the goods of the registrant,”
indicating his belief that such a provision “covers unfair competition
at least in the ordinary sense of the word, which is passing off your
goods for those of others.” 222 Crystallizing his fundamental
divergence with Rogers, he stated, “I think we could very plausibly
tell our foreign friends that ‘[t]his is what we consider unfair
competition.’” 223
Rogers’s argument for retaining the provision that became
Section 44(h) was two-pronged. First, he argued that the United
States has already obligated itself to provide foreigners with
effective protection against unfair competition. The legislative
objective with regard to these obligations is merely to provide a
place in the act to point to that indicates implementation of these

218

Id.

219

The predecessor to the section Byerly revised, was section 3 of the 1920 Act. That section
had required proof of willfulness and an intent to deceive:
SEC. 3. That any person who shall willfully and with intent to deceive, affix,
apply, or annex, or use in connection with any article or articles of merchandise,
or any container or containers of the same, a false designation of origin, including
words or other symbols, tending to falsely identify the origin of the merchandise,
and shall then cause such merchandise to enter into interstate or foreign
commerce, and any person who shall knowingly cause or procure the same to be
transported in interstate or foreign commerce or commerce with Indian tribes, or
shall knowingly deliver the same to any carrier to be so transported shall be liable
to an action at law for damages and to an action in equity for an injunction, at
the suit of any person, firm, or corporation doing business in the locality falsely
indicated as that of origin, or in the region in which said locality is situated, or
at the suit of any association of such persons, firms, or corporations.
Trademark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 533, 534.

220

See Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 164 (Statement by Rogers).

221

Id.

222

Id. at 165 (Statement by Byerly).

223

Id. Possibly disingenuously, Rogers later stated that “[s]ome of our conventions are along
the exact lines . . . . The Inter-American Convention is that kind; that is, it prohibits
unfair competition with respect to the marking of goods.” Id. at 164 (Statement by
Rogers).
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treaty obligations. 224 Second, since foreigners already enjoy this
protection, U.S. citizens should be treated with parity. 225 Byerly’s
stated concern that the bill makes “every act of unfair competition
. . . illegal and [creates] a right of action in the Federal courts for it,
without in any way defining it or tying it up to registration” 226 was
ignored.
Although Rogers did not yield on his position on unfair
competition in the hearing, the statement “All acts of unfair
competition in commerce are declared to be unlawful” was quietly
replaced in the next text with language that more closely resembles
today’s Section 44(h). 227 In addition, Byerly’s proposed language
accepted as well. Thus, in classic legislative fashion, the Lanham
Act ended up with both provisions. This legislative compromise is
partly responsible for the uncertainty over the location of unfair
competition in the Lanham Act, and is emblematic of the schism
between the narrow and expansive views of unfair competition. The
provision that ultimately became Section 43(a) was therefore only a
result of push-back against the provision that became Section 44(h).
B. The Intent of Section 44
The legislative history here recounted reveals numerous explicit
statements about the act’s objectives to import treaty provisions on
unfair competition into U.S. law. In these hearings, Rogers made
clear the import of Section 44 in his soliloquies on how this provision
carried out the nation’s obligations under the Inter-American
Convention. 228 In 1939, Rogers assured Congress that “everything
224

See Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 166, 168 (“we have got [unfair competition
protection] in the convention, and our friends are criticizing us because we say it is in
the convention, and we have not implemented that convention. . . . so that [if] we [could]
point to a section that implements the convention, why we would have accomplished
what we need to do with our Latin-American friends who are pretty critical of us.”)
(Statement by Rogers). That the Inter-American Convention was self-executing and
therefore unnecessary to implement was confirmed the Supreme Court the year after
this hearing. In any event, Rogers bases the desirability of implementation on the
positive diplomatic benefits, not the substantive legal benefits. At the time, there was no
consensus on self-executing status of the Paris Convention whose unfair competition
protections were less extensive. Ladas thought that certain provisions of the Paris
Convention were self-executing. Ladas, supra note 121, at 804 (“[The Paris Convention
contains] an important number of provisions [that] constitute common legislation for all
member countries and need no municipal law to carry them into effect.”).

225

See Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 166 (“The Convention provides that we
will give to foreigners, signatories of the convention, effective protection.”) (Statement
by Rogers).

226

Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 164 (Statement by Thomson).

227

Compare H.R. 4744, supra note 212, with H.R. 6618, id.

228

Treatise author, Rudolf Callmann, stated that the legislative history demonstrates that
Congress was fully aware of the implication of Section 44. See Rudolf Callmann, False
Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 38 TMR 1048, 1057-58 (1948) (“It is a wholly
justifiable inference that the term ‘unfair competition,’ used in a section designed ‘to
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. . . we are obligated to do in our [Inter-American] Convention is
included in this title.” 229 Speaking specifically to what would become
Section 44(i), Rogers explained that “[w]e have the curious anomaly
of this Government giving by treaty and by law with respect to
trade-marks and unfair competition to nationals of foreign
governments greater rights than it gives to its own citizens . . . . This
is an attempt to put the citizen on an equality with the foreigner” 230
by extending the treaty rights to U.S. citizens.
It is Congress’s intent, of course, and not Rogers’s that
matters. 231 Still, according to Ladas, “the evidence is overwhelming
that the object of Congress was to effectuate the stipulations of the
Conventions.” 232 The Lanham Act supports Ladas’s claim, in two
places: In addition to the intent clause in Section 45, 233 the title of
the act explicitly professes that its purpose is, inter alia, “to carry
out the provisions of certain International Conventions.” 234
Another provision in the act also supports the contention that
Section 44 states a federal cause of action for unfair competition.
Section 39 conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts of “all actions
arising under this Act, without regard to the amount in controversy
or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties.” 235
Federal jurisdiction thus depends not on whether the plaintiff's
mark is registered, as had previously been the case, but instead on
whether the action “arises under” the Lanham Act. 236 That is, a
plaintiff need only point to a section of the Lanham Act under which
provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting . . . unfair
competition’ was intended by the draftsmen in its broader sense, as it is used in such
treaties and conventions. The Congressional Hearings furnish sufficient proof that the
legislators were fully cognizant of the implication of that usage and its interpretation.”)
(citations omitted).
229

Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 164.

230

Id. Lanham followed this statement by exclaiming, “I dare say we will find no objection
to that.” Id.

231

See Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860
(1949) (Clark, J. dissenting) (“the [Lanham] Act is rather clearly the expression of . . .
views vigorously held by persons and groups who were able to exercise a persuasive
influence in the halls of Congress during its long period of germination”).

232

Stephen P. Ladas, Trade-Marks and Foreign Trade, 38 TMR 278, 288-89 (1948) (“It was
indeed the intention of those who labored on this Act, as well of Congress, to do as
complete a job as possible in carrying out the stipulations of the International
Convention to which the United States has become a party.”).

233

Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

234

60 Stat. 427, 427.

235

Lanham Act § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (“SEC. 39. The district and territorial courts of the
United States shall have original jurisdiction . . . of all actions arising under this Act,
without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the
citizenship of the parties.”).

236

See Cal. Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., 162 F.2d 893, 900 n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 816 (1947); Callmann, supra note 82, at 886; Charles Bunn, The National Law
of Unfair Competition, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 987, 998 (1949).
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the action arose and this would now constitute an independent
ground for federal jurisdiction.
Any action arising under Section 44 was “under this Act” and
therefore within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under
Section 39. As one contemporary commentator opined, “[n]ot only do
the words of Sections 39 and 44(g), (h) and (i) require this
construction, but any other construction would do violence to the
intent of Congress stated in Section 45.” 237 Ladas was in agreement
with Rogers as to “the significance of sub-sections (h) and (i) of
Section 44 from the point of view of unfair competition law
enforceable by the Federal Courts” was that “these provisions . . .
changed the situation created by the Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
case.” 238
On the direct operability of the Inter-American Convention in
federal courts Ladas argued that “[o]ur constitutional rule is clear
that treaties and Acts of Congress . . . are equally the supreme law
of the land and the Courts are bound to enforce them . . . . [I]f there
is a clear conflict between an earlier treaty and a subsequent
statute, it is the statute that prevails. However, the Courts have
said that a clear intent of Congress to ‘abrogate’ the treaty is
required for the Courts to disregard a treaty stipulation. There is
otherwise a presumption against the existence of a conflict between
provisions of a statute and stipulations of a treaty.” 239 Even were
that not so, he added, “[a]ny doubt as to this may now be deemed to
have been set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in
Bacardi.” 240
Rogers’s understanding that Section 44 provided federal unfair
competition rights in the Lanham Act is supported by his writings.
In 1945—a year before the Lanham Act’s enactment—Rogers
published an article titled “Unfair Competition,” in which he posed
the question, “Have the Industrial Property Treaties Given Us a
237

Diggins, supra note 169, at 207-08 (“Section 45 states that Congress intended to make
‘actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in . . . commerce; to protect
persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition; . . . and to provide rights
and remedies . . . respecting trade-marks, trade names and unfair competition. . . .’ The
only place in which such conduct is made actionable and such protection, rights, and
remedies are afforded in the case of unfair competition not involving registered marks is
in Section 44, so that Congress must have intended that such cases should be actions
arising under the Lanham Act and within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under
Section 39.”).

238

Ladas, supra note 232, at 288; see also Daphne Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual
177 (1947) (“It is clearly apparent that an action for unfair competition is an action
‘arising under the Act,’ and therefore jurisdiction is in the Federal Courts, irrespective
of diversity or lack of diversity of citizenship. The new Act makes an action for unfair
competition relief a statutory right of action and protection will be granted under the
Federal law and not limited to the common law of the States.”).

239

Ladas, supra note 232, at 288-89.

240

Id.
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Code?” 241 Unsurprisingly, Rogers answers this question in the
affirmative. The article was an opportunity for him to explain to the
trademark bar how the Paris and the Inter-American conventions
provided a federal law of unfair competition. In another article
published a year after the Lanham Act became effective, Rogers
made a small, but significant, revision to his question: “Have the
Industrial Property Treaties and the New Trade-Mark Act Given Us
a National Code of Unfair Competition?” 242 Here he unequivocally
states his position as the chief drafter of the Lanham Act that
Section 44 of the Lanham Act is to be read in conjunction with the
treaties to provide a general federal law of unfair competition. 243
Did Rogers successfully create a federal code of unfair
competition protection through this circuitous route? A
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that statutes should
be construed “so as to avoid rendering superfluous” any statutory
language. 244 Therefore, Section 44 must be read in such a way as to
give it meaning that is not elsewhere stated in the act. As a result
of the principle of national treatment contained not only in the
Inter-American Convention, 245 but also the Paris Convention 246 and
now the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 247 all beneficiaries included in Section 44(b) would
be protected by Section 43(a) and would have access to federal court
to sue under this section. Section 44(b) grants to certain
beneficiaries additional treaty rights where those treaty rights are
more extensive than the Lanham Act otherwise provides. Thus,
241

Rogers, supra note 32, at 131.

242

Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act, supra note 103, at
264.

243

This view is supported by a commentator: “we now apparently have a law defining Unfair
Competition, in one aspect made in pursuance of a treaty which constitutes the supreme
law of the land. Specifically it applies to citizens of the United States as well as to foreign
nationals . . . it is urged that by Federal statutory law, applicable to all citizens engaged
in commerce within the control of Congress.” Arthur A. March, Unfair Competition
Defined, 37 TMR 731, 737 (1947).

244

Corley v. U.S., 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“a statute should be read, if possible, so that all
of its provisions are given effect and none is superfluous”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534
U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“[A] cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought,
upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.
167, 174 (2001)); Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112
(1991); D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 235 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (“The construction
contended for would violate the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to
every clause and part of a statute.”).

245

See Inter-American Convention, supra note 8, at 2919 (art. 1).

246

See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, 828
U.N.T.S. 107, 115.

247

The TRIPS Agreement, art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1197.
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citizens of member states to the Inter-American Convention receive
all of the rights granted under the Lanham Act, but also any
additional rights granted by that convention. 248 Writing just after
the passage of the Lanham Act, Ladas admonishes, “[i]n considering
the position of a foreign trade-mark owner claiming the benefits of
. . . the Inter-American Convention, we must always lean to such
interpretation of the provisions of the Act which will give effect to
the stipulations of the Convention, since the definite object of the
Act is to give effect to the Conventions.” 249
Section 44, however, was more than just a vehicle to effectuate
the rights of member states to the Inter-American Convention.
Significantly, it also extended the treaty protections against unfair
competition to U.S. citizens. 250 In so doing, the Lanham Act not only
returned to the federal courts jurisdiction over unfair competition
claims, but expanded the reach of those claims by means of an
innovative treaty.
C. The Drafting Choice Made by Rogers
Why would Rogers, who spent the bulk of his professional life
advocating for stronger protections against unfair competition,
choose such a circuitous route to insert these rights into the Lanham
Act? Ladas later commented on this legislative drafting choice,
observing that Sections 44(h) and (i) “have the effect of placing
trade-names and unfair competition under Federal control.” 251 He
conceded that “this could be done directly insofar as interstate
commerce is concerned, and it may be done thus indirectly in a
provision extending rights to foreigners and then securing the same
benefits to American citizens and residents as to foreigners.” 252
Ladas and Rogers provide differing accounts of how the peculiar
Section 44 came into existence. According to Ladas, Rogers proposed
the idea of including in the act a special title: “International
Conventions” “[i]n late November, 1937,” which Ladas then
drafted. 253 According to Rogers, however, he drafted this section
248

The Supreme Court in Bacardi made this point plainly: “Undoubtedly the Contracting
States are bound respectively to give to the nationals of the other Contracting States the
same rights and remedies that are extended to their own nationals. That is provided in
Article 1. But that provision does not exhaust the rights given by the treaty.” 311 U.S.
150, 165 (1940).

249

Ladas, supra note 2321, at 280.

250

See Lanham Act § 44(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(i).

251

Ladas, supra note 232, at 288.

252

Id.; see also Robert, supra note 238, at 180 (“Somewhat indirectly, but nevertheless
effectively, a Federal Code of unfair competition is thus incorporated into our law.”).

253

Ladas, supra note 232, at 278 (“[Rogers] telephoned me and suggested that it would be
a good idea to include in the new Trade-Mark Act a separate chapter on International
Conventions. . . . I submitted draft of a chapter that contained Sections A to I. This is
what is now Section 44 and my Sections A to I are the subsections of Section 44. Aside
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with John Dienner, president of the American Group of the
International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property
and former delegate to the Paris Convention. 254 Each must be
referring to the specific language of the 1938 bill because the earliest
formulation of an international convention provision dates back to
the 1925 “Rogers Bill.” That bill included a section titled “Paris
Convention,” which read:
Every owner of a trade-mark, being domiciled in any country
which is a party to the [Paris] Convention . . . shall enjoy
with respect to the registration of said trade-mark and while
such registration remains in force all the rights and benefits
concerning trade-marks and unfair competition conferred by
said convention, in so far as the same are not contrary to the
provisions of this act. 255
As with Section 44, this provision appears to incorporate by
reference all additional benefits of the treaty not otherwise provided
in the act. 256 Unfair competition in the Paris Convention would have
been then on the drafters’ minds since it had just been revised that
year to provide broader unfair competition protections. 257 The 1925
draft also included a section devoted to the predecessor PanAmerican convention, referred to in the bill as the “Bueno Aires
Convention.” 258 That section stated that treaty beneficiaries “shall
enjoy . . . all the rights and benefits conferred by articles 2 to 10,
inclusive, of said convention, in so far as the same are not contrary
to the provisions of this act.” 259 Thus the 1925 bill, like its successor,
unmistakably aims to incorporate treaty rights not otherwise
granted by the statute.
Still as Rogers undoubtedly intended to establish robust federal
protections against unfair competition, he could have done so in a
from certain changes in literary style to make it conform to the rest of the Act, the
present Section 44 is practically the text Mr. Rogers and I prepared in 1937.”).
254

See Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 164; Hearings on H.R. 9041, supra note
58, at 195.

255

S. 2679, 68th Cong. § 6(b) (1st Sess. 1925).

256

Likewise, this earlier draft also provides for national treatment in addition to these
treaty rights. The subsequent paragraph reads:
Foreign or alien owners of trade-marks used in this country shall otherwise enjoy
the same right to such trade-marks at common law, and the same right to register
or enforce such trade-marks under the other sections of this act, as in the case of
citizens or residents of the United States, and their rights of priority shall be
determined by their actual use of such trade-marks within the United States.
Id.

257

See supra note 143.

258

See Joint Hearings Before the Comm. on Patents: A Bill to Protect Trade-Marks Used in
Commerce, to Authorize the Registration of Such TradeMarks, and for Other Purposes
S. 2679, 68th Cong. (2d Sess. 1925).

259

Id.
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more direct manner. Rogers likely thought it unnecessary to codify
unfair competition protection in the Lanham Act as they were
already adequately specified in the Inter-American Convention,
which was self-executing, as had recently been confirmed by the
Supreme Court.
Again, evidencing his belief that the Inter-American Convention
was self-executing, Rogers testified that “in the case of a foreigner,
. . . he would sue under the treaty, and that would be a Federal
question anyhow.” 260 Nevertheless, Rogers advocated for having
language in the act that a treaty beneficiary could point to in order
to sue in federal court for substantive rights provided in the InterAmerican Convention. Rogers remonstrated, “I do not want the
finger of scorn pointed at us, because they say, ‘Here, you have
guaranteed to do certain things . . . but you have got to do it by
statute. Now how do you expect us to protect your citizens down here
when you don’t do it up there?’ Now that is the point and it is a
pretty hard question to answer.” 261 One answer is, of course, that
the convention is self-executing in the United States. It seems clear,
however, that Rogers was either using this rhetorical question as a
tactical measure to get his bill passed, or he was seeking to achieve
a strategic advantage diplomatically.
More fundamentally, however, although Rogers would have
been perfectly happy to enact directly the newly invented, sweeping
unfair competition protections included in the Inter-American
Convention, his sophisticated understanding of the limits and
possibilities of unfair competition law based on decades of advocacy,
research, and drafting would have suggested to him that Congress
was not ready to enact the full ambit of protections. The
congressional hearings and redrafting efforts took place during a
period that was rather inhospitable to broad protections.
The history of unfair competition law in the United States from
the late 1800s to the present consists of various periods of
acceptance and rejection of its reach. Given its beginnings at the
turn of the 19th century and its growth through the 1920s, unfair
competition law’s development tracks significant changes in legal
thought from formalism to Legal Realism and its aftermath. 262
Unfair competition had its birth in the era of classical legal thought
where rules prevailed and were derived from principles in common

260

Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 196, at 169.

261

Id.

262

Legal realism reached its pinnacle in the 1930s. See American Legal Realism (William
W. Fisher, Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas A. Reed, eds. 1993); Grant Gilmore, The Ages
of American Law 68-111 (1977); G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to
Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 Va.
L. Rev. 999, 1017 (1972).
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law. 263 Just when unfair competition law had its greatest
opportunity to expand, following International News, 264 however, it
came within the crosshairs of Legal Realism. In fact, Justice
Brandeis’s dissent in that case portended trouble for unfair
competition proponents. 265 Thereafter, the expansion of common
law in this area was subject to the realist critique. 266
Rogers was pushing his drafts in the era of Legal Realist critique
and the fallout of Erie. 267 As there was no federal common law to
codify, there was increased skepticism to the creation of new unfair
competition rights. 268 In addition, beginning in 1938, the
Department of Justice effectively mounted opposition to the act’s
creation of new and stronger rights by arguing that it was
anticompetitive and endangered monopolies. 269
Therefore, the 1930s—precisely the period when Rogers’s bill
was being debated—was a particularly difficult time to be arguing
for new and expanded rights. If the United States already agreed to
these new unfair competition protections in a self-executing treaty,
however, they were not new. Still, it may have been perceived as a
risky strategy to trumpet these treaty rights and argue that
Congress was stuck with them. Opponents may have attempted to
defeat these treaty protections in the new trademark act under the
“last-in-time” rule, which provides that federal statutes may rescind

263

See American Legal Realism, supra note 262, at xii (“When no prior decision seemed
directly applicable, a court often would attempt to extract from the rulings made in a
group of loosely related prior cases a general principle (the more abstract and
encompassing the better) that could be brought to bear on the case before it.”).

264

Nims, supra note 4, at viii (“[Unfair competition law] is still in its infancy.”).

265

Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 258 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Such taking and gainful use
of a product of another which, for reasons of public policy, the law has refused to endow
with the attributes of property, does not become unlawful because the product happens
to have been taken from a rival and is used in competition with him.”).

266

Among the direct attacks was a law review written by Felix Cohen who revealed the
circularity of thinking about goodwill as property when it only has the attributes of
property that the law has bestowed upon it. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935). Others who contributed to the
realist attack on trademark and unfair competition law include Milton Handler &
Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names—An Analysis and Synthesis (pt. 1), 30
Colum. L. Rev. 168 (1930); Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition
(1933); Chafee, supra note 21; Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest:
Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165 (1948)).
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See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 266, at 815.

268

Notably, the first hearings on that bill just preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in
Erie on April 25, 1938. Hearings on H.R. 9041, introduced by Fritz Lanham on January
19, 1938 (75th Cong., 3d Sess.), before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Patents were held on March 15–18, 1938. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins was decided on
April 25, 1938.

269

See McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 5:4.
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any earlier conflicting treaty provisions. 270 Given this possibility, it
would have been prudent to not call any undue attention to the
precise scope of these treaty rights.
VII. THE REVIVAL OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
UNDER SECTION 43(A)
After the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, it must have
seemed that trademark owners had a dazzling set of comprehensive
protections at their disposal. They had a wider net to catch those
who infringed their registered marks, 271 a means to register marks
that had previously been denied registration, 272 and an avenue to
federal court to enjoin those who infringed their unregistered
marks. 273 Trademark owners also now had an arsenal of additional
protections that went well beyond trademark rights even broadly
imagined via Section 44 and the Inter-American Convention. These
protections addressed not only the unfair acts that were then
known, but also offered an avenue to protect against as of yet
unforeseen unfair acts.
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to hold
that Section 44 gives jurisdiction to the district court over claims of
unfair competition. In 1950, in Stauffer v. Exley, 274 the court ruled
in favor of the owner of a trade name used in interstate commerce
on a claim of unfair competition. It held that it had jurisdiction
under Section 44(h) to hear the case despite the absence of diversity
of citizenship even though the case involved a bald claim of unfair
competition unadorned by any other federal claim. Nevertheless,
the court held that the defendant’s use in commerce of names that
referred to the plaintiff’s exercise systems, but that were not
registered by the plaintiff, was actionable as unfair competition
under Section 44(h) and (i). The court’s approach to Section 44 was
adopted in a subsequent decision in Ninth Circuit 275 and followed in
a decision by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 1951. 276
270

See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty and a
federal statute conflict, “the one last in date will control the other”); The Cherokee
Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870).
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Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).

272

Lanham Act § 1(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1).

273

Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

274

184 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1950) (Section 44 creates a cause of action for unfair
competition upon which federal courts have jurisdiction.).

275

See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) (Section 44 gives
jurisdiction to the court over claims of unfair competition). See also Neal v. Thomas
Organ Co., 325 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1963); Magna Pictures Corp. v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 265 F. Supp. 144, 153 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Church, 256 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Cal. 1966).

276

The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) approved this doctrine obiter. In re
Lyndale Farm, 186 F.2d 723, 738 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (“Section 44(i) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
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These cases, however, are not representative of court’s
receptivity to federal unfair competition claims. The decisions in the
decades following enactment of the Lanham Act were confused but
evidenced an overall wariness of claims of unfair competition
brought under the act. Some courts roundly rejected the idea that
the Lanham Act enacted any unfair protection at all. 277 These courts
endeavored to construe the statute so as to preserve common law
limitations on unfair competition such as the requirements for a
passing off claim. 278
Other courts were specifically hostile to the suggestion that
Section 44 provided a federal cause of action for unfair
competition. 279 These courts were dubious that Congress intended
such a sweeping change through so circuitous a route. One district
court explained its hesitancy to follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach:
It is doubtful whether the guarantee in the treaties of the
repression of unfair competition was intended to be broader
than the protection of trade-marks or trade names, or at least
that that was the understanding of Congress when the
Lanham Act was enacted. However that may be, I do not
think that Subsection (i) which gives to citizens of the United
States “the same benefits as are granted by this section” to
foreign nationals could have been intended to effect the
revolutionary expansion of federal jurisdiction for which the
plaintiff contends. 280
§ 1126(i), read in connection with Section 44(g), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1126(g) and Section 44(b),
15 U.S.C.A. § 1126(b) confers upon trade names increased protection from acts of unfair
competition.”).
277

Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc. v. Pest-Guard Prods., Inc., 240 F.2d 814, 818 (5th Cir.
1957) (“Specifically concerned, as it is, with registered trade marks, it would, we think,
be to rewrite instead of to construe the statute if we should read it as including within
its scope unregistered trade marks or unfair competition generally.”); City Messenger of
Hollywood v. City Bonded Messenger Serv., 254 F.2d 531, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1958) (“This
Court is committed to the view that the claim set forth in Count I of the counterclaim for
damages caused by unfair competition is governed by the law of Illinois. We do not think
that the Lanham Act changed this rule.”) (citations omitted); Kaz Mfg. Co. v.
Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815, 824 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (“this Circuit
rejects that notion that the Lanham Act itself creates a cause of action for unfair
competition”).

278

See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir., 1951); Samson
Crane Co. v. Union Nat’l Sales, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 218 (D.C. Mass. 1949).

279

Ross Prods., Inc. v. Newman, 94 F. Supp. 566, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (“If Congress had
intended to work so radical a change in the law, it undoubtedly would have embodied
that purpose in clear and unmistakable language.”); Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v.
Gibson Lighter Mfg. Co., 108 F. Supp. 755, 756-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“The problem is as
delicate and complex as it is important, with both views having much to recommend
them. However, in the absence of a ruling by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit, and
without attempting to make any novel contribution toward the resolution of the problem,
I am constrained to adopt the view of Judge Ryan in the Ross Products case.”).
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L’Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 251, 253-54 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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As other circuits considered Section 44, two lines of authority
emerged. In contrast with the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit read
Section 44 more narrowly and saw it as primarily a means of
implementing treaty law, not enacting sweeping changes to unfair
competition law. Specifically, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Learned Hand, reasoned that Section 44 merely grants U.S.
citizens reciprocal rights against foreign nationals where foreign
nationals would have a right under the treaty. 281 That is, Section 44
relieved only a subset of U.S. claimants from the diversity and
pendent jurisdiction prerequisites and did not create a federal law
of unfair competition available to U.S. citizens generally.
According to the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Section 44,
subsection (i) only grants U.S. citizens the protection that foreigners
get under subsection (h), which is limited in its coverage by
subsection (b). The difference between the Ninth and Second
Circuit’s interpretations centers on whether subsection (b) is to be
read as simply identifying the foreigners who are entitled to the
section’s benefits, or as limiting its application. That is, subsection
(b) either invokes the additional substantive rights of the treaties or
limits the courts’ jurisdiction to cases necessary to carry out our
treaty obligations.
Given the heady issues raised by this circuit split, it is no wonder
that district courts in other circuits sought an alternate means of
resolving these claims. The Third Circuit provided such an
alternative. The Third Circuit sided with the Second Circuit on the
reach of Section 44. Noting that Section 44 is located in the
“International Conventions” section of the act, it queried whether
Congress intended, by inserting “language in a title implementing
international conventions, to establish a federal law of unfair
competition in commerce unrelated to any matter arising out of
some international convention or treaty?” 282 Relying on the
legislative history and giving great weight to Byerly’s interjections
and the location of Section 44 in the section dealing with treaties, it
concluded that Congress sought only to implement non-selfexecuting treaties and not to grant the federal courts any new
authority to hear unfair competitions claims broadly construed. 283
Although the court rejected the plaintiff’s Section 44 claim, it
nevertheless allowed it to assert a non-trademark claim under the
act without diversity jurisdiction. The court held that Section 39
dispenses with the necessity to show diversity of citizenship or any
jurisdictional amount in cases falling under the act, and that
Section 43(a) provides a cause of action for a use of a false
281

AAA v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771, 775 (2d Cir. 1953). Accord Old Reading Brewery, Inc. v.
Lebanon Valley Brewing Co., 102 F. Supp. 434, 438-339 (M.D. Pa. 1952).

282

L’Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 652 (3d Cir. 1954).

283

Id. at 653-54.
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representation in the description of goods sold in commerce. 284 The
court concluded that the text of Section 43(a) unambiguously
evidenced Congress’s intent to change the common law with regard
to the requirements of false representation claims.
The path opened up by the Third Circuit enabled federal
question jurisdiction over any unfair competition claim addressed in
Section 43(a). This proved more palatable as a less dramatic
expansion of federal unfair competition law. It also provided a more
routine approach to legislative change, which courts favored over
the tenuous suggestion in Section 44. The elegant simplicity of
Rogers’s approach was just too understated. As Professor Derenberg
observed a decade after the Lanham Act’s enactment, “this method
for the establishment of a national unfair competition law, derived
from certain provisions of various international conventions, was
quite obviously too subtle and indirect in approach to meet with the
approval of our courts.” 285 Section 44 quickly came to be disfavored
by U.S. courts and was even abandoned by the Ninth Circuit. 286
Rogers himself had no opportunity to influence the
interpretation of Section 44. When the act became effective in 1947,
he was consumed with serving as the Chairman of the Board for the
Sterling Drug Company, and he died in 1949 before any case was
litigated relying on Section 44. 287
Thus in the years following passage of the Lanham Act, unfair
competition lay dormant. When it finally did emerge, it sprang not
from Section 44, but instead from the “minor,” “unnoticed”
Section 43(a). 288 That eventuality, however, took decades to
284

Id. at 651.

285

Walter J. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of
the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1029, 1031 (1957).

286

See, e.g., Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981).
According to McCarthy, the Toho decision “caused hardly a ripple in the world of
intellectual property law, because by then all eyes were focused on section 43(a).” J.
Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is Now Wide Awake, 59 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 45, 50 (1996).

287

Rogers died in 1949. See Obituary, E.S. Rogers, Expert on Patent Law: Board of
Chairman of Sterling Drug Co. Dies—Sponsored Many Fair-Trade Statutes, 74, N.Y.
Times, May 23, 1949. Rogers had a posthumously published article co-authored with
Ladas in which they proposed a new Inter-American Trademark Convention to deal with
the problem of foreign preemptive registration and to address the limited membership
of the 1929 convention. See Rogers and Ladas, supra note 150, at 13-14 (“the only
practical and effective method of adopting uniform solutions of these problems or of
establishing harmony between the legislation of the various countries on these questions
is the adoption of an Inter-American Trade-Mark Convention with suitable
stipulations”).

288

McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 27:7; Derenberg, supra note 285, at 1031. In his treatise,
McCarthy notes Derenberg’s prescience about Sections 44 and 43(a) in this article: “As
early as 1957 Professor Derenberg could state with remarkable foresight that § 44 was
epilogue and § 43(a) was the prologue of a federal law of unfair competition.” McCarthy,
supra note 2, at § 27:7.
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transpire 289 as the courts were initially skeptical of these claims as
well 290 and subjected them to the narrowness that Byerly
intended. 291 But just as had occurred in the early 1900s, a period of
enlargement soon followed. The pressure that built up eventually
forced a broader reading of Section 43(a). 292 Unfair competition
law’s pattern of erratic development thus continued into the modern
era.
At the time of enactment in 1946, Section 43(a) was intended to
be limited to false indications of geographic origin and false
descriptions or representations. It was not intended to broadly
address unfair competition. 293 In its original text, the cause of action
under Section 43(a) for use in commerce of “a false designation of
origin, or any false description or representation, including words or
other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same” was
limited to “any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated
as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or
by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by
the use of any such false description or representation.” 294 That
language makes clear that our modern understanding of “origin”
does not comport with the drafters’ intent. Whereas today we
understand origin to mean source of origin, the original language of

289

Not until Section 43(a) “was about twenty-five years old [did] its potentialities [begin] to
be realized.” McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 27:7.

290

See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951);
Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat’l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), aff’d,
180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950); Bechik Prods., Inc. v. Fed. Silk Mills, Inc., 135 F. Supp.
570 (D. Md. 1955).

291

Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers’ Educ. & Coop. Union of Am., 247 F.2d 809, 819 (8th
Cir. 1957) (“We do not consider that this case raises the question and we do not hold that
the Lanham Act would confer federal jurisdiction for unfair competition when there is
no substantial related claim of infringement under the Act.”); Samson Crane Co. v. Union
Nat’l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949) (“that phrase (‘to protect persons
engaged in such commerce against unfair competition’) must in such a context be
construed to refer not to any competitive practice which in the broad meaning of the
words might be called unfair, but to that ‘unfair competition’ which has been closely
associated with the misuse of trade-marks, i.e., the passing off of one’s own goods as
those of a competitor.”); Gen. Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp., 259 F. Supp. 383, 385
(N.D. Ill. 1966) (“Section 43(a) must be read to embrace only those kinds of unfair
competition which are analogous to, or associated with, the misuse of trademarks or
tradenames, and which produce the same kinds of injuries.”).

292

For instance, a concurring opinion in a Second Circuit case in a 1956 case in which the
plaintiff did not make a claim under Section 43(a), observed that “[T]here is indication
here and elsewhere that the bar has not yet realized the potential impact of this statutory
provision.” Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d
Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).

293

This understanding was reconfirmed in the legislative history of the 1988 revision.
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (effective Nov. 16,
1989).

294

Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
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the act meant origin only in its geographic sense. 295 As a result,
Section 43(a) did not originally provide a general cause of action for
unregistered marks.
Congress made significant substantive revisions to the Lanham
Act in 1988. 296 Along with other amendments, Congress broadened
Section 43(a). 297 Congress was explicit that the amendments created
rights in unregistered marks and created a false advertising
right. 298 The amendments were also intended to codify the courts’
expansive interpretations of Section 43(a). 299 As Senator DeConcini
emphasized, the amendment amended “the language of
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to conform it to the expanded scope
of protection it has been given by the courts.” 300 The Supreme Court
stated that Congress gave “its imprimatur to a growing body of case
law from the Circuits that had expanded the section beyond its
original language.” 301 Congress also codified case law on false
advertising and created a second statutory prong—subsection
43(a)(1)(B). 302
After 1988, Section 43(a) continued to expand beyond the
amendments. An example of this expansion is the decision in Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, in which the Supreme Court held that
unregistered trade dress may be protected absent secondary
meaning in a case involving a claim that the general appearance of
a restaurant was instantly protectable as a nonfunctional,
inherently distinctive mark. 303 The Court thus blurred any
distinctions between trademarks and trade dress, as well as
295

McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 27:7 (“The phrase ‘false designation of origin’ was thought
to be limited to false advertising of geographic origin.”). A broadened sense of origin was
enabled by a 1963 Sixth Circuit opinion. See Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v.
Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963) (finding “origin” to include “origin or source of
manufacture”).
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The main thrust of these amendments was to create an intent-to-use system for
registration and to include anti-dilution protections. The anti-dilution provisions were
not enacted until 1995. McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 5:9.

297

See McCarthy, supra note 286, at 53 (providing a comprehensive overview of the
codification of the 1989 rewriting of Section 43(a) into subsections (1)(A) and (1)(B) to
replace “the by then archaic 1946 language with wording that reflected the reality of case
law interpreted”). Handler notes that the revisions eliminate the “original ambiguities”
of Section 43(a). Handler, supra note 304, at 8.

298

McCarthy, supra note 286, at 53-54 (“The 1989 revision divided section 43(a) into two
distinct sub-sections: the first part relating to use of the statute as a vehicle for assertion
in federal court of unregistered trademark . . . the second part relating to use of the
statute as a vehicle for assertion in a federal court of false advertising (as well as product
disparagement claims.”).

299

See id. at 53 (“section 43(a) was substantially rewritten, in large part to codify the case
law interpretation of previous version of section 43(a)”).

300

134 Cong. Rec. 5864, 5869 (1988) (Statement by Sen. DeConcini) (emphasis added).

301

See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 783 (1992).

302

See McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 27:10.

303

505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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trademark infringement and unfair competition. The result was an
expanded protection for unregistered trade dress where the
impression of the appearance of a product could be substituted for
the evidentiary association that had formed the foundation for the
protection of goodwill.
The extent to which trademark rights eventually would grow
and the manner in which unfair competition protection would be
provided could not easily have been surmised from the act’s 1946
text. The most elastic provision was Section 43(a). Professor
Handler, reflecting on the impact of the Lanham Act fifty years after
its passage, declared that “Section 43(a) has been the fountainhead
of a vast body of law, which now constitutes a federal common law
of trademarks and unfair competition.” 304
The reach of Section 43(a)’s unfair competition protection is,
however, short of Rogers’s aspirations for Section 44(h). As the
Supreme Court acknowledged, Section 43(a) “‘does not have
boundless application as a remedy for unfair trade practices.’” 305
The Court noted that “‘[b]ecause of its inherently limited wording, §
43(a) can never be a federal ‘codification’ of the overall law of “unfair
competition.”’ 306 Because of late utilization of Section 43(a),
beginning in the 1970s and then following the 1988 amendment,
unfair competition developed in a particular way. It was focused on
claims of false source identification and false advertising. It is worth
considering whether unfair competition would have developed
differently if Section 44(h) had operated as intended.
Despite Rogers’s successes in the early 20th century shaping
unfair competition law in both treaty and statute, his vision has
not come to be. Rogers’s conception of unfair competition is absent
from modern cases, as most courts rejected his approach.
VIII. THE UNBEATEN PATH
This article has explained why unfair completion remains
uncertain today after over a century of litigation. The sweeping
protections for unfair competition law never materialized and we
are left with sporadic innovations under Section 43(a). The state of
unfair competition law today, however, still falls short of Rogers’s
vision. While a full analysis of the present-day viability of the path
to unfair competition claims envisioned by Rogers is beyond the
scope of this article, some suggestion about what unfair competition
304

Milton Handler, A Personal Note on Trademark and Unfair Competition Law Before the
Lanham Act, 59 L. & Contemp. Probs. 5, 9 (1996) (“Section 43(a), in my opinion, is the
most significant advance wrought by the Lanham Act . . . ”).
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Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003) (quoting Alfred
Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (1974).

306

Id. (quoting 4 J. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:7, pp. 27-14 (4th
ed. 2002)).
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law could look like in light of this history is in order. This section
will briefly sketch the normative basis for reclaiming the unfair
competition law that was lost along the way.
In addition to the junctures where we went off the course set by
Rogers described in this article, some new obstacles have arisen that
threaten to block that path. For a plaintiff to successfully state a
claim for unfair competition under Section 44(h) or the InterAmerican Convention today, these historic and more recent wrong
turns would need to be corrected.
The historical background of Section 44 here recounted should
make clear that as the main drafter of the Lanham Act, Rogers did
mean to enact a federal law of unfair competition as well as
implement our treaty obligations. The decisions in the 1950s that
the language of Section 44 intended only the latter are incorrect.
Rogers drafted subsection (i) with the intent to give U.S. parties
federal question jurisdiction. Believing the Inter-American
Convention to be self-executing in this country and all other
member states, Rogers was concerned that foreign parties had
rights in the United States, and that U.S. parties had rights in
member states, but that U.S. parties did not have rights in the
United States. Subsection (i) was intended to correct that
“anomalous” situation. 307 It would have been perverse to grant U.S.
parties only a fraction of the rights granted to foreign parties so that
foreign parties could sue U.S. parties, but U.S. parties could not. 308
Whether Rogers’s drafting intentions mirrored Congress’s
intentions is difficult to determine. It is possible that Rogers was
being crafty in hiding a federal code of unfair competition within
provisions that may have seemed only to implement international
obligations. 309 Rogers may have been a few steps ahead of Congress,
but this article has pointed to numerous places in the act’s text and
307

Rogers, supra note 32, at 132 (“[e]ffective protection against these acts is assured to
foreigners. This is a nationwide right accorded to foreigners under the treaty making
power which, under the Constitution, is given to the National government. These treaties
guarantee the same protection to American nationals in foreign countries. It is said that
these rights are not conferred upon American citizens in the United States; but they are
I submit, rights which they ought to have and I believe they do have. American nationals
ought not, I should suppose, have less rights at home than they have abroad, or at home,
less than foreigners.”).

308

Daphne Robert, Commentary on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 86 TMR 373, 393 (1996)
(“Congress recognized the need for uniform protection—particularly since foreign
nationals were entitled to uniform protection under the international conventions. The
new Act gives to citizens and residents of the United States the same protection against
unfair competition as has been afforded foreign nationals under the conventions, and the
acts which are made unlawful are those set out in the conventions.”).

309

David B. Wolf, “Effective Protection Against Unfair Competition” Under Section 44 of the
Lanham Act, 82 TMR 33, 35-37 (1992) (“The problem was that the proponents of
Section 44 were using the unobjectionable goal of implementing [international]
conventions to try to achieve the more controversial goal of overcoming the effects of
Erie.”).
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in the legislative history that evidence Congress’s intent to provide
U.S. parties the unfair competition protections enunciated in the
Inter-American Convention through the Lanham Act. All of the
comments by experts at the time of enactment reflect this
understanding. 310
Without relying on its precedent from the 1950s, the Second
Circuit more recently revisited Section 44 in two cases involving
well-known Cuban trademarks. These cases erected an additional
hurdle. In Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., the court
dismissed a claim for unfair competition brought under
Section 44(h) and Article 21(c) of the Inter-American Convention
concluding that the reach of Article 21 is limited by its text to
covered acts not “effectively dealt with under the domestic laws of
the Contracting States.” 311 The court found that the conduct covered
by Article 21(c) was already effectively prohibited under Section
43(a). 312 In Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corporation, a
subsequent case involving a similar claim, the court held that claims
under Articles 20 and 21 were likewise already addressed by the
language of Section 43(a) and therefore impermissible under
Section 44. 313 As has already been shown above, in addressing the
whole of unfair competition law, these articles go beyond
Section 43(a)’s limited reach. 314 Since Article 20 broadly states that
“[e]very act or deed contrary to commercial good faith or to the
normal and honorable development of industrial or business
activities shall be considered as unfair competition and, therefore,
unjust and prohibited,” and Article 21(e) includes the catcall that
“[a]ny other act or deed contrary to good faith in industrial,
commercial or agricultural matters which, because of its nature or
purpose may be considered analogous or similar to those above
mentioned,” it is difficult to see how the Second Circuit could find
these provisions synonymous with Section 43(a). 315
A close analysis reveals other distinctions between Section 43(a)
and Articles 20 and 21. Significantly, protection under the
convention does not require the showing of a belief in likely damage
310

See, e.g., Robert, supra note 308, at 394 (stating that the acts prohibited as unfair
competition under the Inter-American Convention and Paris Convention “constitute[]
the federal code of unfair competition under the new statute and the Federal Courts have
jurisdiction of all actions to enjoin any of such acts, irrespective of the amount in
controversy or diversity of citizenship of the parties. Suits involving any of the acts of
unfair competition set out above are suits arising under federal law.”); Robert, supra
note 238, at 177, 180; Derenberg, supra note 285, at 1031; Callmann, supra note 228, at
1057-58; Ladas, supra note 232, at 288-89; Diggins, supra note 169, at 207-08; March,
supra note 243, at 737.
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203 F.3d 116, 134 (2d Cir.) (quoting the convention, Art. 21, 46 Stat. at 2932).
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Id.
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399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005).
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See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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Inter-American Convention, supra note 8.
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as is required under Section 43(a). 316 Moreover, a successful action
may lie under the convention where the plaintiff cannot prove a
likelihood of confusion, but nevertheless has evidence of a calculated
misrepresentation. At a minimum, in these ways, acts proscribed by
the convention are not “effectively dealt with” in Section 43(a) and
should be actionable under Section 44(h).
The Fourth Circuit’s Belmora decision does not pose any obstacle
to following the path set by Rogers, but may serve to take us off
course. In dispensing with use of a mark in the United States as a
“condition precedent” to a Section 43(a) claim, Belmora is a
watershed in the development of unfair competition law. 317 Like
previous expansions under Section 43(a), this development will
likely distract from the potential of Section 44. 318
Belmora’s decoupling of unfair competition law from trademark
law could enlarge the reach of unfair competition law exponentially
without resort to Section 44. 319 Not only did the plaintiff not have a
trademark, but in addition, the parties were not in competition as
the plaintiff was not selling its branded product in the United
States. 320 Nevertheless, the court held that this was actionable
unfair competition under Section 43(a). The Belmora decision
highlights an irony in the development of unfair competition law:
Section 43(a) became the vehicle for unfair competition claims only
due to fears about the unlimited scope of Section 44, but now
Belmora has removed the last vestiges of traditional trademark
limitations on unfair competition claims.
316

Id. (“Any person who shall . . . cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . .”);
see also Stauffer, 184 F.2d at 966.
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819 F.3d 697.

318

Belmora has already been followed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. de C.V., 743
Fed. Appx. 457 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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The enlargement of claims beyond trademark claims under Section 43(a) may take on
even greater significance depending on the resolution of an issue prompted by recent
litigation. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has suggested that mark owners
that are refused registration may not bring actions for unregistered marks under
Section 43(a). See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1344 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), aff’d
on other grounds, Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). Although only
dictum, at least one district court has reached exactly this result. See Renna v. Cty. of
Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310, 321 (D.N.J. 2014). The Supreme Court did not resolve this
issue in either Tam or Brunetti. Tam, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1752 n.1; Iancu v.
Brunetti, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). Indeed, the Court may have itself
prompted this issue with its dictum in Taco Cabana: “[Section 43(a)] protects qualifying
unregistered trademarks and . . . the general principles qualifying a mark for
registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are, for the most part, applicable in
determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).” Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768 (citation omitted). Either way this issue is resolved, the
reliance on Section 43(a) will increase. It may remain a vehicle for unregistered marks,
or following Belmora, it may be a means to circumvent a defective trademark altogether.
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819 F.3d at 702.
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After Belmora, the most significant hurdle for non-trademark
owner claiming unfair competition in the United States is standing.
The Supreme Court announced a standing test applicable to
Section 43(a) in Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.: plaintiffs must prove “interests [that] fall within
the zone of interests protected” by the statute, and “injuries [that]
are proximately caused by violations of the statute.” 321 The zone of
interest requirement is satisfied when “it can be reasonably
assumed that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.” 322 The
Lanham Act’s purpose statement in Section 45 helpfully identifies
the statute’s zone of interests for purposes of standing.
Whereas the Supreme Court pointed to Congress’s stated intent
“to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair
competition” in Lexmark, 323 in Belmora the Fourth Circuit pointed
to Congress’s intent in “making actionable the deceptive and
misleading use of marks in . . . commerce.” 324 Presumably the
Fourth Circuit picked an alternate intention identified because the
Belmora plaintiff was not engaged in commerce. What has thus far
escaped notice, however, is that the intention relied on requires the
misleading use of a “mark,” something the Belmora case did not
involve. Defined by the act, a mark is a distinctive device used in
commerce. 325 This case involved the misleading use of a Mexican
mark—a device that presumably meets the demands of Mexican
trademark law. As the designation was not used in commerce,
however, it cannot be a mark under U.S. law and therefore the
Congressional intention identified by the court is not applicable.
The fact pattern in Belmora is precisely the case that was
anticipated by Rogers and the scenario he sought to address in the
Inter-American Convention. 326 Rogers would have instead brought
the case under Section 44(h) as one involving unfair competition and
would have pointed to Congress’s intention “to provide rights and
remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting
trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition.” 327 Since Bayer
would have qualified as a treaty beneficiary under Section 44(b), it
would have stated a cognizable claim under Section 44(h).
There is also a public policy benefit in resurrecting the
Section 44 path in connection with a Belmora-style claim. After the
321

572 U.S. 118, 129-31 (2014).
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Id. Proximate causality requires that the plaintiff’s economic or reputational injuries be
tied to defendant’s conduct. Id. at 133.
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Id. at 132.
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15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 97, at 112 (complaining that the U.S. owner of the BIG BEN
mark was powerless to stop a Mexican party who had been the first to adopt it there).
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15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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Belmora claimant demonstrated standing, there were no guardrails
on the claim of unfair competition. Once the claim was unhinged
from the precondition of a mark, there was no limitation on the
protection. An unfair competition claim brought under Section 44
rather than Section 43(a) would offer the constraints contained in
the Inter-American Convention.
Even before Belmora was decided, a path parallel to Section 44
was being paved. This course relies on the convention directly as a
self-executing treaty. Such claims have proven successful in actions
before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which has held that
the convention “is self-executing and independent of the Lanham
Act.” 328 Outside of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, Bacardi
has rarely been invoked on the self-execution point with respect to
the Inter-American Convention, but two recent district court cases
may signal a revival. A U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California held that Article 18 of the convention contemplates a
private right of action, 329 and a U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey held that Articles 1, 7, 8, 12, 17, 18, 30, and 31 of the
convention create a private cause of action. 330 While claims asserted
directly under the convention avoid any misinterpretation of
Section 44, they do require claimants to be treaty beneficiaries.
In sum, although some obstacles have sprouted up in the path
set by Rogers, that path is not completely obstructed. Now that this
article has indicated where once stood a shortcut to broad unfair
competition claims, the courts will have to decide whether that path
should now be cleared.
CONCLUSION
This article recounts a story in the development of unfair
competition law, some of which has been forgotten and some of
which had not yet been uncovered. Beyond the plot twists and
interesting characters, this story helps explain why unfair
competition law—an area of law that has been a part of U.S. law
for over 100 years—is still so uncertain. It explains why the Fourth
Circuit recently should have asked such a basic question: Does the
Lanham Act permit a party that does not have a trademark to sue
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83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 2007 WL 549241 (T.T.A.B. 2007); Corp. Cimex S.A. v. D.M.
Enters. & Distribs. Inc., 2008 WL 5078739 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (not precedential); Franpovi
S.A. v. Wessin, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 2009 WL 353299 (T.T.A.B. 2009); Lacteos De
Honduras S.A. v. Industrias Sula, S. De R.L. de C.V., 2020 U.S.P.Q.2d 10087, 2020 BL
77266 (T.T.A.B. 2020).

329

Diaz v. Bautista, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199199 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

330

Industria De Alimentos Zenú S.A.S. v. Latinfood U.S. Corp., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
213338 (D.N.J. 2017).

800

Vol. 110 TMR

for unfair competition? 331 Because the answer was still then
unclear.
Based on his path-breaking trademark practice, Edward Rogers
had a keen sense of what protections major U.S. trademark holders
desired both when negotiating the Inter-American Convention and
when drafting the Lanham Act. These insights were coupled with a
sophisticated understanding of the then existing limitations of U.S.
and international trademark law. Roger’s direct participation in the
drafting of the the Inter-American Convention afforded him a
perfect understanding of how the rights established in it would have
extended protection beyond then existing U.S. trademark law. It
may then be regarded as a mystery as to why the 1946 text of the
Lanham Act contained such cryptic and inscrutable treatment of
unfair competition, when it might have instead been explicit and
comprehensive.
The absence of provisions on unfair competition similar to those
in the Inter-American Convention in the Lanham Act is less of a
mystery considering Rogers’s direct and undeniable success in
making the convention directly operable in federal court as a selfexecuting treaty. Rogers likely adopted his circuitous approach to
incorporation of the convention’s protections against unfair
competition strategically given the fraught state of federal common
law at that time and the resistance to changing that situation
legislatively.
This legal history reveals how unfair competition protections
were intended to operate in U.S. law by the drafters of the Lanham
Act—by codifying rights in a self-executing treaty and incorporating
the treaty by reference into the Lanham Act. This ambitious
approach by Rogers, however, proved too circuitous for courts
applying the new act. Today Rogers’s life’s work remains obscured.
Trademark practitioners and scholars readily accept that
Section 43(a) states a federal claim of unfair competition. This
article suggests that federal unfair competition protection in the
Lanham Act, however, does not end there. In addition to claims
related to consumer confusion of source indicators and false
advertising, Section 44(h) and the Inter-American Convention offer
additional protections further afield from trademark rights. For
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The court explicitly asked the parties that basic question during oral argument. Oral
Argument, Belmora, LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016)
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lack of understanding, however, these protections have thus far lay
dormant.

